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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the actual and potential consequences of the 
inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world.  This thesis has three 
major arguments.  First, the inter-American democracy regime “matters” because it can 
positively impact state and individual behavior in the post-Cold War inter-American 
system.  Second, the three principles that constitute this regime (democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations) are mutually reinforcing in 
perpetuating the “community of democracies” in the Western Hemisphere.  Finally, this 
inter-American “community of democracies” is plausibly on a path to a pluralistic 
security community based on the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime.  This thesis places the actual and potential consequences of this regime into a 
broader, systemic context.  This thesis critically examines two high-profile cases of 
democratic crisis, Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000) to assess the actual impact of the 
post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.  These research findings are later 
extrapolated to assess the potential impact of this regime in the post-Cold War inter-
American system.  In short, this thesis concludes that, in the post-Cold War world, the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE INTER-AMERICAN “COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES” 
The Western Hemisphere begins the twenty-first century with a “near-universal 
embrace of democracy.”1  Democracy currently prevails in every country throughout the 
hemisphere, with the obvious exception of Cuba.  “Increasingly, the member states of the 
hemisphere are presenting themselves as a single democratic community, committed to 
safeguarding and consolidating democratic regimes throughout the region.”2   
This inter-American community of democracies is comparable to the North 
Atlantic community of democracies in three specific ways:  (1) its political systems are 
democratic; (2) its economies are increasingly free market-oriented; and (3) disputes 
between its nations are generally settled by negotiation or arbitration.3  In fact, these three 
principles have become so internalized throughout the hemisphere that at the most recent 
Summit of the Americas meeting in April 2001 in Quebec, President George W. Bush 
proudly proclaimed that the Americas had a great collective vision:  “A fully democratic 
hemisphere bound together by goodwill and free trade.”4  Later in the same speech the 
President added, “that’s a tall order.  It’s a chance of a lifetime.  This is not the time to 
grow timid or weary.  We will inspire the world by our example.”5  These three 
principles are also addressed in the most recent National Security Strategy of the United 
States: 
Together we will promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our 
integration advances security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope.  We will 
work with regional institutions, such as the Summit of the Americas 
                                                 
1 Forrest D. Colburn, Latin America at the End of Politics, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
2002), p. 3. 
2 Larry Diamond, “Democracy in Latin America:  Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for 
Consolidation,” in Tom Farer, ed., pp. 52-104, Beyond Sovereignty:  Collectively Defending Democracy in 
the Americas, (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 52. 
3 Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy:  Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st 
Century, (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 83. 
4 Nahlah Ayed, “Leaders Agree on Democracy Clause,” National Post Online, April 21, 2001, 
[http://www.nationalpost.com/features/summit2001/20010421story5.html], p. 2, Accessed January 21, 
2002. 
5 Ibid.  Emphasis Mine. 
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process, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Defense 
Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of the entire hemisphere.6 
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME 
These three principles constitute the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime.  First, as noted earlier, most of the nations in the Western Hemisphere have 
become democracies.  Second, with respect to free-market economics, globalization has 
resulted in a more integrated and interdependent hemisphere.  At present, integration and 
interdependence is limited to subregional groupings such as MERCOSUR and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Nevertheless, even these limited agreements 
“have increased the links of economic, social, and even political interdependence among 
the countries of the region.”7  Furthermore, the proposed Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) represents an ambitious goal for increased economic integration and 
interdependence in the twenty-first century.  Third, with respect to negotiation and 
arbitration, the South American nations in particular have “succeeded in developing a 
theory and practice of exceptionalism regarding their recourse to international law- 
arbitration of disputes, mediation, bilateral negotiations, and other techniques for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes- rather than the use of force in their international 
relations.”8  Moreover, multilateralism has become institutionalized as a “foundational 
architectural principle” for discussing important issues on the post-Cold War inter-
American agenda such as democracy promotion, freer trade, counter-narcotics, and 
international terrorism.9  This fact is evidenced primarily by the collective hemispheric 
commitment to the Summit of the Americas process and, more significantly, in the 
increasing legitimacy and credibility of the OAS in supporting, promoting, and defending 
democracy in the region.  
                                                 
6 National Security Strategy of the United States, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html], p. 
9, Accessed on September 20, 2002. 
7 Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World:  South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective, (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 101. 
8 Ibid., p. 102. 
9 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism:  The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., 
pp. 3-47, Multilateralism Matters:  The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 25.  Please note that this list of issues on the Inter-American agenda is certainly 
intended to be an exhaustive one.       
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The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the dynamics of the post-Cold 
War inter-American democracy regime.  More specifically, this thesis seeks to evaluate 
whether or not the rhetoric of a “community of democracies” is genuinely representative 
of, or if it even approximates, the reality of inter-American relations in the post-Cold War 
world.  Resolution of this puzzle is important because, 
For decades, even before the OAS was formally established in 1948, the 
countries of the Western Hemisphere repeatedly expressed their allegiance 
to democracy and the democratic ideal.  At the same time, democratic 
governments in Latin America were often toppled by coups d’état, and 
many of the countries of the region lived for years under a variety of 
oppressive, authoritarian regimes, some of which held periodic but plainly 
unfair elections.10 
Without a doubt, much progress has been achieved in the inter-American system 
in the post-Cold War world.  This thesis seeks to critically examine the actual impact of 
the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime on the achievement of this historic 
progress and, potentially, on the future of the inter-American system itself.  Furthermore, 
this thesis seeks to resolve the puzzle of whether or not the Americas can transcend the 
frustrations of its historical legacy regarding democracy.  More specifically, this thesis 
seeks to answer the following question:  What are the actual and potential 
consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world for 
the Western Hemisphere?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis has three major arguments.  First, the inter-American democracy 
regime “matters” because it positively impacts state and individual behavior in the post-
Cold War inter-American system.  Second, the three principles that constitute this regime 
are mutually reinforcing in perpetuating the “community of democracies” in the Western 
Hemisphere.  Finally, this inter-American “community of democracies” is plausibly on a 
path to the emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of the three 
principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.11  
                                                 
10 Domingo E. Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the 
Protection of Democracy,” in Tom Farer, ed., pp. 132-149, Beyond Sovereignty:  Collectively Defending 
Democracy in the Americas, (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 132. 
11 In this context, the term “international organizations” is used very broadly in this thesis to describe 
not only “formal” organizations such as the OAS, but also international law, institutions, multilateralism, 
etc. 
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The significance of this thesis issues from its promise to place the actual and 
potential consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime into a 
broader systemic context.  Traditionally, scholars of international relations specifically 
interested in the study of security communities and the democratic peace proposition 
have focused their research on the North Atlantic community of democracies.  The 
reasons for this are obvious, considering that before the end of the Cold War Western 
Europe and North America represented the only two geographic regions where peace and 
democracy were well established.12  Since the end of the Cold War and the proliferation 
of democracies in the Western Hemisphere, scholars of international relations have 
studied specific dyadic relationships in the inter-American system such as that of the 
United States and Mexico.13  Significant research has also been conducted on the 
“Southern Cone” countries.14  However, the historic progress of the “inter-American 
system” has too often been neglected, under-appreciated, and undervalued as a case study 
in this context.  There are many potential lessons to be learned from the dynamics of the 
post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime for not only the developing world but, 
more significantly, for the entire international system as well.  This thesis seeks to 
address this crucial gap in the theoretical literature.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use both primary and secondary source material.  Primary sources 
will be limited primarily to official OAS documents to demonstrate the formal evolution 
of that organization’s role in supporting, promoting, and defending democracy in the 
post-Cold War inter-American system.  Secondary sources will include texts by leading 
scholars of international relations theory and the Western Hemisphere to provide the 
reader with the necessary theoretical and regional context of the research question. 
 
                                                 
12 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order:  Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil, 
(Chatham, NJ:  Chatham House, 1993), p. 7. 
13 See Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, “The United States and Mexico:  A Pluralistic 
Security Community?” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 295-332, Security Communities, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
14 See Andrew Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in South America?” in Emanuel Adler 
and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 228-264, Security Communities, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1998) and Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World, pp. 67-124. 
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The case study method will be employed to answer the research question.  Any 
potential conclusions from this analysis are limited to the specific dynamics of the post-
Cold War inter-American system and thus cannot necessarily be generalized to explain 
the dynamics of similar regimes in other geographic regions.  The merits and limitations 
of extrapolation in this context are many, and both will be will be specifically addressed 
in the conclusion of this thesis.  In short, the individual and collective impact of 
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations will be assessed in each 
case study. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner.  Chapter II will provide a 
literature review of the major theoretical debates regarding the research question.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with the necessary analytical framework 
for understanding and appreciating the significance of the research question.  More 
specifically, this chapter will describe and explain the logic of the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime in the context of the much broader theories of international 
relations that support it.  
Chapter III will identify the operating principles of the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime.  The purpose of this chapter is to specifically outline the 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of this regime.  This chapter 
will critically examine the evolution of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime to demonstrate exactly what makes it different from preceding regimes of 
cooperation in the hemisphere. 
Chapter IV will be two case studies of the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime in action.  The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the actual 
impact of the inter-American democracy regime on state, and individual, behavior in two 
of the most high-profile democratic crises in the post-Cold War inter-American system:  
Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000).  In short, a process-trace of the chain of events leading 
up to the two democratic crises, and their respective outcomes, will be conducted in order 
to test the strength of this regime in these two specific cases.15  
                                                 
15 The process-trace case study method can provide a strong test of a theory.  See Stephen Van Evera, 
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1997), pp 64-67. 
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Chapter V will specifically answer the research question.  First, this chapter will 
briefly summarize the arguments for why the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime matters and thus assess its actual impact on state and individual behavior in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Second, this chapter will consider how some of the challenges 
described and explained in Chapter II might affect the potential consequences of this 
regime.  In this context, the plausibility of the emergence of a pluralistic security 
community in the Americas based on the logic of the three principles of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations will be assessed.  Third, the merits and 
limitations of extrapolating the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime will be assessed by considering additional variables that seemingly contribute to 
or impede its actual and potential consequences.  Finally, this chapter will conclude with 
an assessment of potential future areas for scholarly and policy relevant work on this 
subject. 
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II. THE LOGIC OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
REGIME:  A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review of the major 
theoretical debates regarding the research question.  The logic of the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime will be critically examined in the following manner.  First, a 
general theory regarding the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, 
and international organizations will be introduced within the context of Immanuel Kant’s 
original work on this subject, Perpetual Peace.  Second, a neo-Kantian perspective of 
“perpetual peace,” and the potential consequences of it, will be described and explained.  
Third, the major challenges to this logic will be addressed.  Finally, this logic will be 
specifically applied to the post-Cold War inter-American system. 
A. THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The logic that democracy, interdependence, and international organizations are 
mutually reinforcing in preserving peace is not based on any new or revolutionary 
thinking in international relations theory.  In fact, such logic actually dates back to at 
least the eighteenth century. More specifically, such logic dates back to at least Immanuel 
Kant and his famous essay, Perpetual Peace.16   
1. The Kantian Perspective on Peace 
Kant believed that “it is the destiny of humankind to steadily progress.”17  For 
Kant, historical progress ultimately meant “perpetual peace.” More specifically, it was 
Kant’s conviction that “to work for peace was man’s moral duty, to enjoy peace his 
natural end, and to achieve it his probable destiny.18  Consequently, in Perpetual Peace, 
“Kant presented a stark choice for governments:  they must either make collective efforts 
to ensure survival or face joint self-destruction.”19   
                                                 
16 See Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Lewis White Beck, ed., pp. 85-135, Kant on History, 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ:  Prentice Hall, 2001). 
17 Carl Joachim Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 66.  It is 
important to note that although Kant believed that the fulfillment of this destiny is merely an idea, he still 
believed, according to Friedrich, that it was a very useful one toward which we should direct our efforts.  
18 Ibid., p. xi. 
19 Sissela Bok, A Strategy for Peace:  Human Values and the Threat of War, (New York:  Pantheon 
Books, 1989), p. 31.  Emphasis Mine. 
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Kant realized that “perpetual peace” inherently required “perpetual work.”  In 
fact, this is precisely why man had to “work for peace;” it was no easy accomplishment.   
Moreover, Kant himself argued that war, not peace, was the natural state of man.  
Consequently, Section II of Perpetual Peace, entitled “Containing the Definitive Articles 
for Perpetual Peace Among States,” begins with the following declaration:  “A state of 
peace, therefore, must be established, for in order to be secured against hostility it is not 
sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless this security is pledged to 
each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state), each may treat his 
neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.”20 
Kant produced “three definitive articles” that described how nations could 
collectively work for perpetual peace.21      
One is what he called “republican constitutions,” which in the present era 
we interpret as representative democracy, with freedom, legal equality of 
subjects, and the separation of governmental powers.  An understanding of 
the legitimate rights of all citizens and republics in turn creates, in Kant’s 
view, a moral foundation upon which a “pacific union” can be established 
by treaty in international law and organization.  Finally, what he called 
“cosmopolitan law,” embodied in commerce and free trade, creates 
transnational ties of material incentives that encourage accommodation 
rather than conflict.22 
The Kantian perspective on peace is particularly compelling given its historical 
context.  First, Kant was no stranger to war.  He spent most of his life in one of the most 
militaristic nations in history:  Frederick the Great’s Prussia.23  Second, “there were very 
few democracies in the world in the late 1700s and no international organizations as we 
now know them.”24  Finally, and perhaps most compelling, Kant’s perspective on peace 
significantly deviated from the traditional Westphalian nation-state system into which he 
was born.  For example, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the end of 
hostilities in the Thirty Years War, the international system has operated under two 
                                                 
20 Kant, p. 92. 
21 Ibid., pp. 92-105. 
22 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace:  Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 29. 
23 Bok, p. 31. 
24 Russett and Oneal, p. 29. 
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fundamental principles:  (1) territorial (or external) sovereignty and (2) the reciprocal 
recognition of the legitimacy of all forms of government (i.e. internal sovereignty).  
Although Kant’s three definitive articles were not specifically concerned with the former 
principle, regarding the latter one, his federation, as originally conceived, was intended to 
be limited to a “community of democracies.”  Consequently, Kant’s perspective on peace 
inherently challenged the concept of internal sovereignty in this context.25  More 
significantly, Kant based this challenge on freely enacted, self-imposed, and universal 
moral laws to guide political action at the individual, domestic, and international level.  
In Kant’s view, not even national security or self-defense in extreme danger could justify 
breaching moral principles.26   
A “federation of states” or a “community of democracies” based exclusively on 
“universal moral laws” intuitively seems quixotic to say the least.27  This seems 
particularly so in an era of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction 
in which the recalcitrance of just one state, or non-state actor for that matter (as 
evidenced by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001), can have disastrous 
consequences.  However, it would be a mistake to render Kant’s perspective on peace 
completely irrelevant, even if it is in fact admittedly impractical given its focus on 
morality.  If anything, the reality of the awesome destructiveness of these modern 
weapons inherently makes Kant’s goal of perpetual peace more relevant than ever.  
Consequently, it is necessary to evaluate Kant’s three definitive articles in the context of 
the post-Cold War world.    
                                                 
25 Hedley Bull incorporates this concept of internal sovereignty into his “rules of coexistence.”  In 
short, “each state accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state 
over its own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty 
from other states.  A corollary or near-corollary of this central rule is that states will not intervene forcibly 
or dictatorially in one another’s internal affairs.  Another is the rule establishing the ‘equality’ of all states 
in the sense of their like enjoyment of like rights of sovereignty.”  See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical 
Society:  A Study of Order in World Politics (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 70.  For an 
alternative view of the significance of the Peace of Westphalia and the concept of sovereignty, see Stephen 
D. Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., pp. 235-264, 
Ideas and Foreign Policy:  Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change  (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 
1993). 
26 Bok, p. 50. 
27 It is important to note that Kant, who wrote Perpetual Peace in the eighteenth century, probably 
never could have fathomed the awesome destructiveness and threat of modern weapons and thus that self-
destruction did not require a “joint effort,” but could be brought about suddenly by the decision of just one 
or a few individuals. 
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2. A Neo-Kantian Perspective on Peace 
There are two major problems with Kant’s perspective on peace.  First, given the 
fact that the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations did not exist as we currently know them in his lifetime, his logic in 
Perpetual Peace is largely “deductive and speculative.”28  Consequently, he cannot 
provide any empirical evidence to support his logic (because none existed at the time).  
Second, Kant’s passionate conviction that morality supersedes all, even national security, 
is simply not practical in the post-Cold War world.  Nevertheless, Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace has become an important symbolic and substantive source of inspiration for 
scholars of international relations theory, particular those who are advocates of the 
democratic peace proposition.29  Given the spread of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations in the post-Cold War world, Kant’s perspective on peace 
seems more compelling, and relevant, than ever.  
A recent, and explicit, “neo-Kantian perspective” on peace is the work of Russett 
and Oneal (2001).30  In Triangulating Peace, the authors specifically address the two 
major problems identified above regarding Kant’s original perspective on peace.  First, 
the authors test Kant’s three definitive articles using social scientific methods.  More 
specifically, they use the years 1885-1992 as their empirical laboratory to assess the 
peacefulness of democratic, interdependent states linked by international organizations.  
The authors test both the individual and collective impact of these three principles on 
state behavior.  Second, the authors purport that morality and interests are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive; in fact, they can even be complementary.  In other words, the authors  
argue that peace does not depend on moral conversion but is ultimately derived from 
calculations of self-interest.31   
 
                                                 
28 Russett and Oneal, p. 272. 
29 James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict:  An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace 
Proposition (Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 3.  See, for example, Michael W. 
Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and 
Steven E. Miller, eds., pp. 3-57, Debating the Democratic Peace, (Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 1996). 
30 See also Bruce Russett, “A neo-Kantian perspective:  democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations in building security communities,” in Emanuel and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 
368-394, Security Communities, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998).   
31 Russett and Oneal, p. 269. 
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a. The Empirical Evidence for a “Neo-Kantian Peace” 
“The absence of war between democracies comes as close to anything we 
have to an empirical law in international relations.”32  In Triangulating Peace, Russett 
and Oneal specifically seek to test this hypothesis.  As Kant did before them in Perpetual 
Peace, the authors begin their neo-Kantian perspective on peace with particular attention 
to democracy as the linchpin of their analysis.33  In short, they posit a causal relationship 
between “domestic democracy” and that state’s inclination to resolve conflict with other 
democracies by means other than or just short of war.  Thus, the type of government, in 
this case democracy, is the independent variable and the absence of war between 
democratic states is the dependent variable.34  The authors apply the same causal 
relationship to the principles of interdependence and international organizations. The 
remainder of this section will summarize the results of their empirical analysis regarding 
the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations on state behavior.35  Furthermore, after considering the most relevant 
challenges to this logic, Russett and Oneal’s neo-Kantian perspective will then be 
specifically applied to the Western Hemisphere to assess the actual and potential 
consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world.  
Russett and Oneal define democracy as “a country where (1) most citizens 
can vote, (2) the government comes to power in a free and fair election contested by two 
or more parties, and (3) the executive is either popularly elected (a presidential system) or 
is held responsible to an elected legislature (a parliamentary system).”36  The authors 
concede that it is not always easy to identify a democracy.  However, a working 
definition is necessary in order to determine falsifiability.   
                                                 
32 Jack Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The 
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 88. 
33 Russett and Oneal, p. 273.  Emphasis Mine. 
34 For a more in-depth analysis of this proposition, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic 
Peace:  Principles for a Post-Cold War World, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-42. 
35 However, please note that a critical analysis of Russet and Oneal’s research methodology is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  The purpose of summarizing their results here is simply to recognize the fact that 
this research has been done by reputable scholars specifically to evaluate the logic of Kant’s three 
definitive articles.   
36 Russett and Oneal, p. 44. 
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In short, the authors identify two specific features of democracy that 
restrain them from using coercive threats against, or actually going to war, with other 
democracies: (1) structural constraints and (2) democratic norms and culture.  Structural 
explanations focus on the institutional constraints inherent to democracy.  For example, 
“a separation of powers requires the executive to secure legislative approval and funding 
for war, and institutions that make democratic leaders accountable for bad decisions 
make democracies reluctant to go to war.”37  Cultural explanations focus on shared 
democratic norms, perceptions, and expectations.  In other words, “democratic peoples, 
who solve their domestic political disputes without resorting to organized violence 
against their opponents, should be inclined to resolve problems arising in their relations 
with other democratic peoples in the same way.”38   
Based on their empirical research, Russett and Oneal report that 
democracy does in fact have an independent impact on state behavior.  Even after 
controlling for the independent and collective pacifying effects of interdependence and 
joint memberships in international organizations, the authors still found that “two 
democracies are 33 percent less likely than the average dyad to become involved in a 
militarized dispute.”39  It is, of course, important to note here that the authors do not 
claim that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with nondemocratically 
constituted states.  In fact, the authors specifically argue that when a democratic state 
comes into conflict with a nondemocratic state, it will not expect the latter to be 
restrained by structural or cultural norms.  If anything, the democratic state will most 
likely be compelled to adapt to the harsher norms of the nondemocratic state, “lest it be 
exploited or eliminated by the nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent 
moderation of democracies.”40   
According to Russett and Oneal, “interdependence increases the prospects 
for peace because individuals can generally be expected to pursue their interests 
rationally, and it is not in the interest of one state to fight another with which it has 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 53. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 275. 
40 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 33.  
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important economic relations.”41  However, it is important to note that interdependence is 
not simply limited to economics.  “Trade and investment serve as media for 
communication between nations on a broad range of matters beyond their specific 
commercial relations, thereby exposing people to the ideas and perspectives of others on 
a range of issues.”42  In short, Russett and Oneal’s empirical research on interdependence 
suggests that dyadic states will try to avoid conflict when their commercial relations are 
considered economically important.  “Two states with a relatively high level of bilateral 
trade are 33 percent less likely to become involved in a dispute than are states with an 
average level of interdependence, all other things being equal.”43  Perhaps even more 
significantly, the authors reported a positive correlation between the general economic 
openness of states, even when controlling for the level of their respective bilateral 
interdependence. 
Russett and Oneal also reported an independent impact on state behavior 
regarding international organizations.  More specifically, “a pair of states that shares 
membership in a substantial number of international organizations is 24 percent less 
likely than average to have a dispute, holding other influences constant.”44  Thus, the 
independent effects of democracy and interdependence, each at 33 percent, are obviously 
more substantial than the independent effects of international organizations.  However, 
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations impact state behavior both 
individually and collectively.  More specifically, as the post-Cold War world 
demonstrates, democracies tend to be interdependent and members of the same 
international organizations.  In other words, as one of these principles increase the others 
do not remain constant or decrease.  In this context, it is important to note that the authors 
                                                 
41 Russett and Oneal, p. 277. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Russett and Oneal, p. 279. 
44 Ibid., p. 281. 
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reported that the likelihood of a dispute drops by 71 percent if all three principles are 
increased simultaneously.45     
b. Potential Consequences of a Neo-Kantian Peace 
Russett and Oneal’s research indicates that democracy and 
interdependence have the greater individual impact on state behavior, but also that 
international organizations generally support these two principles.  Moreover, the 
collective impact of these three principles results in a mutually reinforcing system that 
plausibly increases the prospects for peace.   
Assuming Russett and Oneal’s research findings are true, a more specific 
potential consequence of increased democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations is the emergence of a “pluralistic security community,” in which the use of 
force is almost virtually unimaginable.46  In this context, a “community of democracies” 
whose members are also highly interdependent and participate in international 
organizations that affirmatively promote both democracy and interdependence should, in 
theory, be inherently peaceful in their relations with one another; perhaps even more 
peaceful than a security community not based exclusively on these three principles.  The 
argument for the correlation between this neo-Kantian perspective and the potential 
emergence of a security community is as follows: 
Democracies rarely fight each other:  they perceive each other as peaceful.  
They perceive each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms 
governing their domestic decision-making processes.  For the same 
reason, they form pluralistic security communities of shared values.  
Because they perceive each other as peaceful and express a sense of 
community, they are likely to overcome obstacles against international 
cooperation and to form international institutions such as alliances.  The  
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 282.  Emphasis mine.  Russett and Oneal’s findings seemingly validate Kant’s deductive 
and speculative logic regarding democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.  This statistic 
is particularly relevant to the post-Cold War inter-American system because, with the obvious exception of 
Cuba, the remaining countries are all democracies and members of many of the same international 
organizations (e.g. OAS, UN, etc.).  Moreover, interdependence continues to grow as legislators in 
respective countries consider expansion of existing agreements (e.g. NAFA and MERCOSUR) and the 
creation of new ones (e.g. FTAA).  
46 See Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kahn, Maurice Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond 
Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, and Richard Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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norms regulating interactions in such institutions are expected to reflect 
the shared democratic values and to resemble the domestic decision-
making norms.47 
It is necessary to identify exactly what constitutes a “security community” 
so that the potential for the emergence of such a community in the Americas, based on 
the three principles of the inter-American democracy regime, can be assessed in future 
chapters of this thesis.  In short, a security community is “a transnational region 
comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.”48  Security communities can be either loosely or tightly coupled.  
Loosely coupled security communities exhibit the minimal definitional properties just 
described.  Tightly coupled security communities, on the other hand, exhibit much more 
hierarchy in their relations with one another.  This thesis is concerned with the former 
type of security community, as it is seemingly more applicable to the dynamics of the 
post-Cold War inter-American system.  
A security community consists of three “tiers.”  The first tier concerns the 
precipitating conditions that compel states to orient themselves in each other’s direction 
and to cooperate.  The second tier examines the positive, dynamic, and reciprocal 
relationship between the structure of the region, defined by material power and 
knowledge, and social processes, defined by organizations, transactions, and social 
learning.  These dynamics create the conditions for the third tier:  mutual trust and 
collective identity formation.49  More specifically, according to Deutsch (1957), a 
security community is characterized by  
a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we feeling,” trust, and 
mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-image and 
interests; of mutually successful predictions of state behavior…in short, a 
matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, 
                                                 
47 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community:  The Case of NATO,” in 
Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., pp. 357-399, The Culture of National Security:  Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 371. 
48 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in 
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 29-65, Security Communities, (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 30. 
49 Ibid., p. 37. 
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communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of 
decision making.50 
A security community can be based on principles other than democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations.51  Certainly shared identities and 
mutual trust can be forged in other ways.  However, some scholars of international 
relations argue that liberal ideas such as democracy and interdependence are more prone 
than are other ideas for the promotion of a collective identity, mutual trust, and peaceful 
changes.52  Demonstrating whether liberal ideas are more prone than are other ideas in 
the development of security communities is definitely beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, given the demonstrated individual and collective impact of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior, this thesis is 
interested in critically analyzing the dynamics of a security community based on these 
three principles.  More specifically, this thesis is interested in assessing the prospects for 
the emergence of such a community in the inter-American system in the post-Cold War 
world.   
B. CHALLENGES TO THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY, 
INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Numerous challenges exist to the logic of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations just described in the previous section.53  However, the results 
of Russett and Oneal’s research address many of these challenges.  Therefore, this section 
of the thesis will specifically focus on the challenges that this author personally found the 
most challenging to this logic. 
The primary challenge is traditional realist theory.54  Interestingly, Mearsheimer 
(2001), a distinguished international relations scholar of the realist persuasion concedes 
                                                 
50 Deutsch et al., p. 6. 
51 Moreover, the principles and norms inherent to the neo-Kantian perspective can in principle be 
unlearned, since collective identities might change over time. 
52 Adler and Barnett, p. 40. 
53 For a detailed critique of the democratic peace proposition and the “Kantian Peace” see Christopher 
Layne, “Kant or Cant:  The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
and Steven E. Miller, eds., pp.157-201, Debating the Democratic Peace, (Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 
1996). 
54 An excellent source for a more in-depth analysis of this broader theoretical debate is David A. 
Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism:  The Contemporary Debate, (New York:  Columbia 
University Press).  
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that, “as challenges to realism go, democratic peace theory is among the strongest.”55  
Nevertheless, realists still generally dispute the claims that democracies do not fight other 
democracies.  Their dispute is largely definitional (e.g. what is a “democracy” and what 
constitutes “war”).  Fundamentally, though, the dispute is a function of the realist 
conviction that the structure of the international system, and its anarchic ordering 
principle, are the primary determinants of state behavior.  Anarchy thus compels states to 
operate in a competitive, self-help system in which the maximization of power, self-
interest, and survival are the exclusive aims.  Realists deem the structural/institutional 
and normative/cultural constraints of democracy irrelevant because major qualitative 
change is impossible and thus the fundamental causes of international conflict cannot be 
transcended.56  Moreover, since states are by nature fundamentally self-interested, realists 
have also traditionally emphasized that “it is naïve and potentially even dangerous to 
think that states could ever form collective identities.”57 
Many realists concede the fact that modern democracies have not waged war on 
one another.58  Some realists, such as Schweller (2000), actually conclude that 
“democracy can ameliorate some of the causes of war cited by Hobbes and other realists, 
but it cannot entirely eliminate them.”59  This criticism is unfair though because the 
                                                 
55 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York:  W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001), p. 367. 
56 Randall L. Schweller, “US Democracy Promotion:  Realist Reflections,” in Michael Cox, G. John 
Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., pp. 40-62, American Democracy Promotion:  Impulses, Strategies, 
and Impacts, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 43. 
57 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 229. 
58 However, it is important to note that realists do not really have a choice in this matter because it is 
an empirical fact.  See, for example, Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 16.  Russett reports that it 
is impossible to identify any wars between democratic states dating back to 1815 (out of approximately 71 
interstate wars involving a total of nearly 270 participants).  One recent possible case of two democracies 
waging war on one another is the militarized interstate dispute between Ecuador and Peru in 1995.  
However, given the scope limitations of Russett’s theory, it is difficult to classify this case as potentially 
disconfirming because Peru’s status as a “democracy” is questionable at the time (after the 1992 
autogolpe).  It is questionable because, for Russett, only “liberal democracies” qualify as democracies.  
Moreover, statistics regarding the battle-deaths in this dispute vary greatly from as little as 300 to as many 
as 1,000.  The actual number is important because Russett uses a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths to classify 
“war.”  Regardless of the whether Peru can be considered a “democracy” or how many actual battle-deaths 
occurred, the Ecuador-Peru dispute is significant because, in both countries, domestic public opinion 
supported the use of force against the other.  See David R. Mares, Violent Peace:  Militarized Interstate 
Bargaining in Latin America, (New York:  Columbia University Press), pp. 160-189.     
59 Schweller, p. 43. 
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democratic peace proposition is a probabilistic theory.60  Therefore, the important 
question is not whether democracy can eliminate conflict but whether it can make 
conflict less likely.  Russett and Oneal’s research seems to suggest that it can make 
conflict less likely.  One more problem regarding democracy in this context though is the 
problem of backsliding.  Mearsheimer argues that no democracy can be certain that 
another democracy will retain their liberal, democratic integrity.  Thus, “prudence 
dictates that democracies prepare for that eventuality, which means striving to have as 
much power as possible just in case a friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood 
bully.”61  This point is compelling; however, empirically, it has not yet been a problem in 
the post-Cold War world.  More importantly, as will be demonstrated in the following 
chapter, the point has already been effectively dealt with in the context of the dynamics 
of the inter-American system.  
The realist critique of interdependence and international organizations follows the 
same logic.  Regarding interdependence and free trade, Schweller in particular argues that 
they reinforce competition and that competition produces winners and losers.62  Although 
the free-market does produce winners and losers, it has also proven to be a seemingly 
“indispensable vehicle for producing wealth.”63  While import-substitution, socialism, 
and communism have all failed, “the expanded trade and investment at the core of 
globalization provides countries with an opportunity to increase their exports and growth 
and so improve the overall standard of living of their peoples.”64  Furthermore, there is 
little empirical evidence to support that economic competition or inequality inevitably  
                                                 
60 The neo-Kantian perspective posited by Russett and Oneal regarding the logic of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations is also a “probabilistic theory.” 
61 Mearsheimer, p. 368. 
62 Schweller, p. 53. 
63 Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World:  Peace, Democracy, and Free 
Markets in the Twenty-first Century, (New York:  Public Affairs, 2002), p. 1. 
64 Carol Lancaster, “Developing Countries:  Winners or Losers?” Chapter 30, 
[http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:yFMqpbfLcZMC:web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/C30Lanca.pdf+%22
Developing+Countries:++Winners+or+Losers%3F%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8], p. 657, Accessed on January 
2, 2003.  Although Lancaster argues that the potential negative impacts of globalization, such a “relative 
deprivation,” are often overstated, she also argues that the leaders of the international economy 
(particularly the United States) need to develop “social safety nets” for developing countries to deal with 
globalization’s many challenges. 
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increases the risk of conflict.  In fact, according to some economists at the World Bank, 
there is absolutely no correlation between inequality, whether of income or land, and the 
risk of conflict.”65 
Regarding international organizations, realists argue that they are insignificant 
determinants of state behavior because they are “purely reflective of the power and 
interests of states:  they are just power politics translated into a different idiom.”66  
Although it is true that international organizations usually do not have the capacity to 
force compliance on a given issue, some can still perform very important functions that 
can potentially influence state behavior.  For example, 
They may encourage cooperation by facilitating consultation and 
coordination among their members.  They may create norms that make 
noncompliance with their decisions politically difficult.  More centralized 
IGOs can impose various economic sanctions:  allow states to impose 
countervailing tariffs, freeze assets, refuse to grant loans, prohibit 
commercial aviation or shipping, for instances.67 
The following counter-arguments are possibly even more challenging to the logic 
of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.  First is the argument 
that the democratic peace is merely a phenomenon of the Cold War.68  Gowa (1999) 
discredits the entire democratic peace hypothesis by arguing that the peace that has 
existed among democratic countries after 1945 can simply be interpreted as “a product of 
the interest patterns that the advent of the Cold War induced.”69  Furthermore, she argues 
that “a democratic peace did not exist in the pre-1914 world, and it cannot be 
                                                 
65 See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War,” February 17, 
1999, [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict], Accessed on January 20, 2002. 
66 Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes:  A Reflective Approach,” in 
Volker Rittberger, ed., pp. 49-72, Regime Theory and International Relations, (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 51. 
67 Russett and Oneal, pp. 280-281. 
68 Another important critique of democratic peace theory is that democracy simply has not been 
around long enough to draw any definitive conclusions.  For example, until the latter half of the twentieth 
century, democratic states were a rarity, making the random chance of war between them close to zero.  
Thus, the absence of war between democracies in this context proves little.  This logic is particularly 
relevant to the “post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime,” as its formalization is just over a 
decade old. 
69 Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets:  The Elusive Democratic Peace, (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 3. 
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extrapolated to the post-Cold War world.”70  However, as Russett and Oneal note, “the 
idea that alliances are formed against a common enemy ignores the deeper of question of 
why the enemy is perceived as common.”71  Mutual trust and identity as “democratic 
states” surely shaped the perception of those allied against the Soviet Union (during the 
Cold War).  Moreover, as nations continue to reap the peaceful benefits of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations there is no reason to believe why mutual 
trust and identity as “democratic states” will not continue to grow in the post-Cold War 
world.  In this context, one possible explanation of the democratic peace is,  
The meaning of the identity “democratic state” is changing as states begin 
to internalize the belief that democratic states do not make war on each 
other.  If democratic peace theorists are right this regularity has always 
existed, but only recently has it become part of the meaning of the 
democratic type.72  
In other words, perhaps democracy (as well as interdependence and international 
organizations) is, as Wendt (1994) argued regarding anarchy, simply “what states make 
of it.”73  The three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations definitely seem to constitute the collective identity of international society 
at the dawn of the twenty-first century.    
Second is the process of democratization itself and the comparative level of 
democracy in a given dyad.  Snyder (2000) concedes that well-established mature 
democracies consistently demonstrate peaceful inclinations toward one another, but that 
democratizing regimes are more war-prone than stable political regimes.74   This 
argument is actually consistent with the general democratic peace hypothesis, which is 
limited to “well-established democracies.”  Thus, according to Russett and Oneal, “if 
policies designed to promote democracy around the world lead promptly to the 
consolidation of democratic institutions and practices, there is no reason, even in the 
                                                 
70 Ibid., p. 113. 
71 Russett and Oneal, p. 60.  Emphasis Mine.   
72 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 226-227. 
73 See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., pp. 77-94, International Organization:  A 
Reader, (New York:  HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 80. 
74 See Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence:  Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, (W. W. 
Norton & Company), p. 310. 
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short term to expect an increase in the frequency of violence between countries.”75  The 
challenge here that Russett and Oneal do not address though is that there is a big 
difference between the consolidation and deepening of democracy.  According to 
Diamond (1996), consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly 
and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down.  
Democratic deepening, on the other hand, improves the quality, depth, and authenticity of 
democracy in several dimensions:   
Fairer, freer, more vigorous, and more extensive political competition; 
broader, more autonomous, and more inclusive participation and 
representation; more comprehensively and rigorously protected civil 
liberties; and more systematic and transparent accountability.76 
In short, democratic consolidation is concerned primarily with democratic 
survival.  Democratic deepening, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with the 
quality or level of democracy.  Consequently, given the role that Russett and Oneal 
attribute to structural and cultural explanations in maintaining the democratic peace, one 
would intuitively expect a positive correlation between the deepening of a given state’s 
democracy and the individual impact of these particular restraints on state behavior.  
Weart (1998) argues that well-established republics, whether democratic or oligarchic, 
are inhibited by their fundamental nature from warring on one another.  However, he also 
purports that “republics do get into wars with their own kind when one of them is not 
well-established, that is, when its leaders cannot fully be trusted to practice toleration 
instead of coercion.”77  In other words, republics can get into wars with their own kind 
when, in the case of democracies, they are not at the same level of democracy or have not 
experienced sufficient democratic deepening.  This argument is particularly challenging 
in the context of the inter-American system, as the level of democratic deepening varies 
throughout the entire hemisphere. 
                                                 
75 Russett and Oneal, p. 276. 
76 See Diamond, pp. 54-55. 
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Yale University Press, 1998), p. 294. 
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Another challenge within the context of democratic deepening is nationalism.  
According to Kupchan (2002), a collective public nationalism is at the heart of liberal 
democracy. 
It is the critical ingredient that brings the faceless state to life by merging 
with the mythical nation, the resulting nation-state then able to embrace 
the citizen through its emotional allure.  But nationalism is also a 
persistent source of rivalry among the very nation-states that it brings to 
life.78 
In Latin America in particular, such nationalism has given rise to new leaders 
such as “President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, a former labor leader born a 
peasant, and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, a former army colonel who led the coup that 
overthrew President Jamil Mahuad, a Harvard-educated favorite of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in January 2000.”79     
The final challenge, and possibly the most critical one that must be addressed in 
this section of the thesis, is the argument that peace has long existed in the Western 
Hemisphere without the current dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations.  In short, empirical evidence demonstrates a relatively low 
propensity for war in the Western Hemisphere.  According to Singer and Small (1972), 
the Western Hemisphere had the lowest number of wars per year during their sample 
(0.11) and the lowest battle deaths per year (3,100) of any region of the world.80  Thus, 
the Western Hemisphere has not historically been a very war prone region even before 
the creation of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.   
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Desch (1998) argues, “the historical experience of the Western Hemisphere 
suggests that it was extremely peaceful even absent democracy and this further confounds 
the democratic peace argument.”81  This challenge is significant because, if true, then the 
actual and potential consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime seemingly become less significant.  However, the problem with Desch’s analysis 
is that it assumes peace is simply defined by the mere absence of war.  He does not 
differentiate between a “negative peace” (the absence of war), a “stable peace” (no 
expectations of violence), or a “pluralistic security community.”82  Moreover, the phrase 
“extremely peaceful” is somewhat disingenuous.  Even though, technically, there has 
historically been a low propensity for interstate violence in the hemisphere, the legacy of 
authoritarianism has not exactly been a positive experience for most Latin Americans.  
Therefore, based on the empirical research of Singer and Small, there has historically 
been a “quantitative peace” in the Western Hemisphere; but it certainly has not been a 
“qualitative” one.83      
C. THE LOGIC OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME 
The logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is based 
primarily on the collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations on state and individual behavior in the Western Hemisphere.  Democracy is 
the linchpin of this regime, but interdependence and international organizations have 
important individual and collective contributions to a qualitative peace in the hemisphere.  
In short, this qualitative peace is based on the collective effort of the inter-American 
community of democracies to affirmatively strengthen this regime in the post-Cold War 
world.   
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The collective effort to strengthen the inter-American democracy regime in the 
post-Cold War world will be described and explained in Chapters III and IV.  More 
specifically, Chapter III will specifically outline the operating principles of the post-Cold 
War inter-American democracy regime.  The following chapter will also critically 
analyze the evolution of this regime to demonstrate exactly what makes the post-Cold 
War inter-American democracy regime different from preceding regimes of cooperation 
in the hemisphere.  The potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime 
for the Western Hemisphere in the post-Cold War world will be assessed within the 
context of the relevant challenges introduced in this chapter that might impede this 
regime’s further strengthening.  Moreover, the plausibility of the emergence of a 
pluralistic security community based on the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime will be specifically assessed within the context of these potential 
challenges.    
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III. THE OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY REGIME 
“Never before in Latin America’s history have so many countries featured 
constitutional governments, elected in free and competitive elections under effective 
universal suffrage, that choose to pursue market economy policies.”84  In confluence with 
the increasing legitimacy and credibility of international organizations in the hemisphere, 
the prospects for inter-American cooperation and peace have never seemed brighter.  The 
last chapter demonstrated the theoretical logic for this argument.  This chapter will apply 
this logic to the post-Cold War inter-American system.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
outline the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the post-Cold 
War inter-American democracy regime.  More specifically, this chapter will describe and 
explain the origins and evolution of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime.  Additionally, this chapter will critically analyze the preceding regimes of 
cooperation in the hemisphere to differentiate them from the new post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime. 
A. DEFINING “REGIME CHANGE” AND “REGIME STRENGTH” 
The post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is certainly not the first 
regime of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.  As noted in the introduction of this 
thesis, “for decades, even before the OAS was formally established in 1948, the countries 
of the Western Hemisphere repeatedly expressed their allegiance to democracy and the 
democratic ideal.”85  However, in retrospect, it was not really until the early 1980s that 
the reality of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations began to 
approximate the rhetoric of it.86  Therefore, two questions seem to suggest themselves:  
(1) What makes the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime different from 
preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere and (2) Does the post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime actually impact state behavior?  Another way of 
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framing the latter question is:  Does the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime 
matter?  The former question is one of “regime change” and the latter is one of “regime 
strength.”  This chapter will focus on the former question and Chapter IV will focus on 
the latter one. 
In short, a regime is a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue 
area of international relations.”87  In the specific case of the inter-American democracy 
regime, principles and norms are represented by democracy and interdependence (e.g. 
free market, free trade, etc.) and rules and decision-making procedures are represented by 
international organizations (e.g. international law and multilateral institutions such as the 
OAS, WTO, MERCOSUR, etc.).  The purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements and 
the principles and norms of a given regime provide its fundamental defining 
characteristics.  Changes in rules and decision-making procedures represent changes 
within regimes, but changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.88  A 
given regime has weakened if its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with its 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.89  In other words, the strength 
of a given regime is roughly correlative to its actual impact on state behavior.  In this 
context, strength is measured by whether the actions of states in a given regime are 
consistent with its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.   
B. A HISTORY OF REGIMES OF COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE 
Convergence about the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations in the Western Hemisphere is not a new phenomenon.  A previous vision 
for increased hemispheric cooperation in this context is the concept of “the Western 
Hemisphere Idea,” which actually originated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  The “Western Hemisphere Idea” is the proposition that the peoples of the 
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Americas stand in a “special relationship to one another” that sets them apart from the 
rest of the world.90  More specifically, it is the idea that the nations of the Western 
Hemisphere, having achieved independence far before the majority of modern nations, 
share a destiny based on common political values.  It is the idea that these nations share 
common economic interests, as well as common security concerns.  “It also includes the 
belief that inter-American cooperation and integration makes domestic political 
institutions healthier and domestic economies more prosperous.”91 
1. The Rise and Fall of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” 
A common criticism of the United States in its inter-American relations has been 
the alleged inconsistency of its foreign policy.  However, this is not necessarily the case.  
The United States has consistently based its foreign policy objectives on its perceived 
national interests, whether in the Western Hemisphere or abroad.92  Ironically, this fact is 
the source of both the rise and fall of the “Western Hemisphere Idea,” as it has resulted in 
a dichotomous foreign policy strategy of intervention and neglect by the United States in 
the region.  This is important to appreciate because, as explained in Chapter II, peace, 
within the context of the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations, is ultimately derived from “calculations of self-interest.”  Therefore, the 
argument for why the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime differs from 
preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere is based, fundamentally, on a change 
in the perceived national interests of the United States in the post-Cold War world.  For 
example, since the end of the Cold War, traditional national interests and threat 
perceptions have been modified given the increasing importance of the three principles of 
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.  This fundamental change 
in national interests and threat perceptions is evident in Latin America as well.  This latter  
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point is significant because it directly challenges the realist proposition that the norms 
and principles of a given regime are merely “a record of the methods and results of power 
politics.”93    
a. Preceding Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere 
Corrales and Feinberg (1999) identify three major regimes of cooperation 
in the history of inter-American relations.94  The first regime lasted from 1889-1906, the 
second from 1933-1954, and the third began in the late 1980s and constitutes what this 
author has classified, “the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.”  The 
purpose of this section of the thesis is to critically analyze the respective perceived 
national interests of the United States and Latin America that established the principles 
and norms of these three different regimes of cooperation. 
Respective perceived national interests of the United States and Latin 
America precluded the creation of a regime of cooperation before the late 1880s.  For 
example, the early 1800s provided what seemed to be an excellent pretext for increased 
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.  Trade was rapidly developing between the 
United States and Latin America.  “U.S. exports to Latin America rose from $6.7 million 
in 1816 to nearly $8 million in 1821, despite a slump caused by the 1819 economic 
panic.”95  However, the perceived threat of possible European intervention weighed 
much more heavily on the minds of U.S. decision-makers.  Consequently, in 1823, the 
President announced the “Monroe Doctrine.”  The Monroe Doctrine contained three 
substantive principles that reflected the perceived national interests of the United States:  
(1) “The American continents…are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European powers;” (2) “In the wars of the European powers in 
matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with out 
policy to do so;” and (3) “We should consider any attempt on [the Europeans’] part to 
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extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety.”96  
Latin America shared similar national interests at this time. Consequently, 
Latin American leaders generally approved of the Monroe Doctrine.  “Brazil and 
Colombia even suggested instituting the Monroe Doctrine as a hemispheric doctrine.”97  
Moreover, in 1826, the presidents of Colombia, Central America, and Mexico invited the 
United States and Brazil to participate in the Congress of Panama.  Conditions thus 
seemed ripe for the creation of the first regime of cooperation in the hemisphere.  
However, from the very beginning of their history as independent nations, the reality of 
inter-American relations did not approximate the rhetoric of it.  Although the rhetoric of 
collective agreement on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine made it seem as if the 
“Western Hemisphere Idea” had become institutionalized, the reality of inter-American 
relations at this time was quite different.  For example, the United States remained neutral 
during the Latin American revolutionary wars and was slow in recognizing them once 
they successfully achieved independence.  Latin Americans, on the other hand, “could 
never make up their mind whether they wanted inter-American cooperation, and if so, 
whether it should be based on the principle of culture (Latin-Catholic countries only), 
language (Spanish-speaking countries only), or strategic interest (include a European 
guarantor, exclude nations with territorial disputes).”98  Consequently, a regime of 
cooperation did not materialize until the late 1880s. 
The first regime of cooperation was not created until the U.S. Congress 
approved a Pan-American conference in 1889.  The impetus for the United States was to 
broaden the scope of the Monroe Doctrine.  “Rather than simply seeking to keep 
extrahemispheric actors out, the U.S. now wanted to create formal institutions to facilitate 
common political, economic, and security objectives- the establishment of a hemispheric 
peace-keeping system, including arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and the 
development of trade-enhancing rules, including a customs union.”99  However, although 
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Latin American nations generally welcomed the invitation, their interests at this time 
were not aligned with the United States on this issue; particularly regarding the creation 
of a regional customs union.100  Because the United States and Latin America did not 
perceive the same national interests, the actual policy results of the 1889 Pan-American 
Conference were inconsequential.  The creation of the conference itself was significant 
though because it established a precedent for mutual consultation regarding important 
hemispheric matters.  More specifically, the conference was significant because it 
“constituted a regional precursor to a League-of-Nations-like system of inter-American 
relations, including a formal organization (with a permanent seat in Washington).”101 
In the early 1900s, the perceived national interests of the United States and 
Latin America began to diverge significantly.  For example, in 1904, the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine claimed a universal responsibility for the United States 
in the Western Hemisphere:    
In the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the 
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international police power.102 
At this time, Latin America’s perceived national interests were based on 
the principles and norms of nonintervention (the Calvo Doctrine) and the equal treatment 
of foreigners (the Drago Doctrine).  The logic of these national interests was based on the 
realities of growing U.S. hegemony in the region.  The Latin American nations intuitively 
knew that they could not balance their power against the United States in the traditional 
sense because they did not possess substantial power in this regard.  Consequently, and 
impressively, Latin America chose to rely on “Pan-American institutions to deal with the 
U.S. (and one another) and codifying the norm or nonintervention and consultation.”103  
Thus, based on their perceived national interests, the nations of Latin America 
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institutionalized multilateralism well before the creation of the OAS.  The “Western 
Hemisphere Idea” was still alive, but just within the southern portion of the hemisphere. 
The second major initiative for a regime of cooperation in the hemisphere 
is evident in the years between 1933 and 1954.  In President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
inaugural address, he announced that “in our relations with the western hemisphere, we 
shall be guided by the principle of the good neighbor.”104  The rhetoric from both the 
United States and Latin America again seemed very promising.  The concepts of the 
“Western Hemisphere Idea” were manifest in two very specific ways.  First, in the 
Declaration of Lima, in which the United States and Latin America discussed the 
potential for “continental solidarity based on democratic values against military 
assault.”105  Second, during and following World War II, “they formulated a common 
policy against European perils, built a system of collective security (the Rio Treaty, 
1947), and created a formal organization to address hemispheric affairs (the Organization 
of American States, OAS, 1948).”106   
Given the rhetoric of democracy and international organizations at this 
time, conditions seemed much improved regarding the potential persistence of this 
second regime of cooperation in the region.  However, yet once again, the reality of inter-
American relations did not match the rhetoric. In short, although the regime contained the 
principles and norms of democracy and international organizations, it was still missing 
the third critical variable of interdependence.  More important though, the divergence in 
the perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America at the beginning 
of and throughout the Cold War resulted in profound hemispheric mistrust.  Examples of 
this antagonism included Latin American countries voting against the United States in the 
United Nations as well as the United States becoming much less inclined to use, or even 
consider the use, of hemispheric institutions such as the OAS in the planning and 
execution of its foreign policy strategy in the region.  The Cold War thus marked the fall 
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of the second major regime of cooperation in the region and, for much of the rest of the 
twentieth century, of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” itself.     
b. The Cold War in the Americas 
Throughout the Cold War, perceived national interests compelled the 
United States to generally abandon the “Western Hemisphere Idea.”  A specific example 
of how perceived national interests shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in 
this context was George Kennan’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.  Kennan was the 
intellectual father of the U.S. containment strategy.  Kennan’s corollary is significant 
because, as Henry Kissinger noted in his own memoirs, “George Kennan came as close to 
authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.”107  The 
following corollary to the Monroe Doctrine thus defined the operating principles of inter-
American relations, from the U.S. perspective, throughout the Cold War.   
…Where the concepts and traditions of popular governments are too weak 
to absorb successfully the intensity of the communist attack, then we must 
concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only 
answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose 
origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of 
democratic procedures; and that such regimes and such methods may be 
preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further 
communist success.108 
Thus, the operating principles of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War were 
completely inconsistent with the “Western Hemisphere Idea.”  In fact, throughout the 
Cold War, the United States ended up only supporting or promoting democracy if it did 
not interfere with its primary foreign policy goal of containment.  Democracy was thus 
no longer necessarily the preferred system of government from the U.S. perspective.  
Taken to its logical extreme, the Kennan Corollary resulted in a Cold War legacy of 
undermining legitimate, democratically elected governments if they appeared to have any 
socialist tendencies (most notably Allende’s Chile and Arbenz’s Guatemala).  This 
extrapolation of Kennan’s logic, and its consequences on inter-American relations 
throughout the Cold War, is perhaps best exemplified in the following quote attributed to 
ce to Allende’s Chile:  “I don’t see why we should have to Dr. Henry Kissinger in referen
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stand by and let a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”109  
Additionally, regarding Guatemala, President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, actually listed 
his administration’s role in the overthrow of Arbenz as “one of his proudest 
accomplishments.”110 
Perceived national interests in Latin America during the Cold War equally 
contributed to the fall of the second regime of cooperation, and of the “Western 
Hemisphere Idea.”  First, regarding democracy, Latin American nations such as Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Peru slid back into military control.  “What had 
been a continent pursuing democratic change and incorporating the poor and uneducated 
rapidly became a set of governments committed to slowing down that process by assuring 
the maintenance of law and order.”111   
Second, regarding economics, the logic of interdependence in the inter-
American system turned into the logic of dependence.  Dependency became the dominant 
paradigm amongst scholars in post-Word War II Latin America.  The primary public 
policy consequence of dependencia, throughout Latin America, was import-substitution-
industrialization (ISI).  Raúl Prebisch, of the United Nations’ Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), forcefully articulated the underlying 
rationale for ISI.  In 1963, he argued, “domestic industrialization would foster the spread 
of technology, increase employment, enhance the productivity of the labor force, thus 
reducing the region’s vulnerability to international economic forces.”112  Since Latin 
America’s dependent position in the international system inherently placed external 
constraints on its development, ISI policies sought to “enhance industrial development 
through protection of domestic markets via tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions and with 
targeted subsidies to local producers.”113   
                                                 
109 Ibid., p. 164. 
110 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope:  The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1991). 
111 Fishlow, “The Western Hemisphere Relation,” p. 23. 
112 Carlos Lozada, “Economic Policy Trends in Post-World War II Latin America,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, (4th Quarter, 1999):  p. 39  
113 Ibid. 
33 
Initially, ISI seemed successful.  Latin American GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 5.1 percent from 1951 to 1960 and experienced even higher growth rates in 
the 1960s expanding at an average annual rate of 5.75 percent from 1961 to 1973.114  In 
the long term though, ISI policies failed to resolve Latin America’s strategic dilemma of 
its relative dependent position in the international system.  In the process of attempting to 
transcend the external constraints of the international system, Latin America created its 
own internal constraints.  In short, by giving inefficient industries protective tariffs, 
government subsidies, and tax breaks, Latin America insulated itself from genuine 
international competition.  More specifically, while it was relatively easy to create a basic 
iron and steel industry, it proved harder to establish high-tech industries like computers, 
aerospace, machine tools, and pharmaceuticals.  Consequently, Latin America generally 
depended on imported manufactured goods, whereas exports still consisted of non-value 
added raw materials such as oil, coffee, and soybeans.115   Ironically, from the Latin 
American perspective, the legacy of ISI was that “this need for foreign inputs aggravated 
the very problem the region was trying to avoid:  external dependence.”116 
Third, regarding international organizations, the OAS became relatively 
insignificant to Latin Americans as well because they did not regard their interests as 
harmonious with those of the United States.  Consequently, the OAS was mired in dissent 
and inaction, and by the early-to-mid 1980s the inter-American system and “The Western 
Hemisphere Idea” were seemingly moribund.117 
c. The Resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the 
Origins of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy 
Regime 
The Cold War profoundly affected the inter-American system.  The 
inclination of the United States to perceive its national interests strictly through an East-
West prism often distorted its policy towards Latin America.  In Latin America, 
authoritarian governments were temporarily able to claim political legitimacy, even in 
d democratic traditions, on the grounds of anti-communism countries with strong and prou                                                 
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or populism.  However, even though the “Western Hemisphere Idea” was abandoned 
during this time-period, it was not completely forgotten.  The decline of the second 
regime of cooperation “did not retreat to the low levels of cooperation in the 1906-1933 
period.”118  Although the principles and norms inherent to the containment strategy 
dominated U.S. foreign policy and the principles and norms of the Calvo and Drago 
Doctrines dominated Latin American foreign policy, the principles and norms of the 
“Western Hemisphere Idea” were resurrected once again in the early-to-mid 1980s.  
Important principles and norms of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations although weakened, managed to survive during the period.  The 
resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” is significant because it represents the 
origins of a new, third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere:  the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime.  More importantly, it is significant because the origins of 
this new regime can be specifically traced back not to the leaders of the United States (the 
hegemon in the region) but to the efforts of various leaders throughout Latin America.  
The first of these leaders that deserves mention, and credit, for the 
resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the origins of the post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime is President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina.  In his 
inaugural speech in 1983, Alfonsín expressed his ambitious vision for Argentina. 
With a country with new institutions, democracy, and development, 
Argentina will bring a significant contribution to establish a more secure 
and fair international system…Bearing this in mind, I would like to make 
clear that our foreign policy will coherently mirror our domestic 
politics…We will seek social justice for Argentines and will not cease to 
look for ways to establish within the international system some aspects of 
morality and justice between nations.  We will strive for peace for our 
violence-ridden territory and will seek peace for all inhabitants of this 
planet.  We will seek freedom and democracy for the Argentines, with the 
resoluteness that provides the traumatic experience of living under 
authoritarianism and repression.  We will fight for freedom and 
democracy throughout the world.119 
In this speech, Alfonsín assured his constituents that he had a great vision 
for Argentina, for the Western Hemisphere, and for the entire international system.  This 
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vision was largely based on the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations described in Chapter II.  For example, regarding democracy, his 
commitment was genuine.  Moreover, he astutely considered the possibility, or perhaps 
the likelihood, that others in Argentina (such as the military) might not share this 
commitment.  Consequently, he specifically negotiated democracy clauses in cooperation 
treaties with various Western European countries (notably Spain in 1987 and Italy in 
1988) to preclude the possibility of democratic backsliding. 
Regarding interdependence and international organizations (specifically in 
the context of multilateralism and diplomacy), Alfonsín was even more ambitious.  First, 
in 1986, Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney (of Brazil) negotiated and signed the Argentine-
Brazilian Economic Integration Program (ABEIP). 120  This program was an integral part 
of Alfonsín’s strategy because he firmly believed that democratic consolidation in 
Argentina was intimately linked to good performance by democratic institutions in the 
economic sphere; the 1986 treaty was partly founded on the assumption that better 
integrated economic relations with Brazil could help revitalize Argentina’s declining 
economy.121  This agreement was a critical antecedent to MERCOSUR and it 
significantly improved Argentina and Brazil’s bilateral relationship.  This fact in itself 
was significant because, as Robert Burr noted, “the theme of the Argentine-Brazilian 
rivalry and struggle for influence in Latin America is the oldest of all the Latin American 
conflicts.”122  Consequently, their bilateral relations had historically been characterized 
by deep suspicion and mistrust.   
Second, and perhaps even more important to note regarding the 
improvement of Argentina and Brazil’s bilateral relationship, was the creation of a new 
nuclear security regime of cooperation.  In November of 1985, Presidents Alfonsín and 
Sarney endorsed the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and promised more 
cooperation in this field.  Alfonsín essentially employed the logic of democracy, 
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interdependence, and international organizations to inch Argentina and its newly 
democratic neighbors closer to a de facto loosely coupled security community in the 
Southern Cone by the early 1990s.  For example, in September 1991 Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile signed the Mendoza Agreements, which banned chemical and biological 
weapons.  In December of that same year, Argentina and Brazil signed the Foz do Iguacu 
Declaration, which established a binational organization of nuclear cooperation (a 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, 
ABACC).123  In retrospect, given the history of suspicion and mistrust between 
Argentina and Brazil and their respective experiences with authoritarianism during the 
Cold War, the statesmanship exhibited by Alfonsín and Sarney in this context was truly 
remarkable and inspiring.  “Despite facing a regional security environment apparently 
predisposed toward the emergence of a nuclear arms race, in their efforts to transform 
relations these pro-democratic statesmen created a bilateral regime that laid the political, 
security, and institutional foundations for verified nuclear non-proliferation in the 
1990s.”124 
Another excellent example of the resurrection of the “Western 
Hemisphere Idea” is the exceptional statesmanship provided by Oscar Arias Sánchez in 
mediating the Central American conflict.125  This example, much like the Alfonsín case, 
demonstrates the significant role of Latin Americans in institutionalizing the logic of 
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in the hemisphere.  Arias 
was elected President of Costa Rica in 1986.  His extraordinary efforts to provide a 
Central American solution to a Central American problem ultimately earned him a Nobel 
Prize for bringing peace and democracy to the sub-region.  In short, with skillful 
diplomacy and dogged determination, Arias persuaded chief executives from Central 
America to continue negotiations among themselves after negotiations within the 
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framework of the Contadora Group stalled.126  The final settlement reached was called 
the Esquipulas Accords, named after the town where the first meeting took place.  Most 
notably, the August 1987 agreement called for free elections and the general 
democratization of Central America. 
2. The Evolution of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy 
Regime 
The creation of the third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere, the post-Cold 
inter-American democracy regime, has its origins with the great vision and statesmanship 
of leaders such as Alfonsín and Arias.  The changed perceptions of their national interests 
empowered them to transcend the breakdown of the two preceding regimes of 
cooperation in the hemisphere.  Moreover, changed perceptions of their national interests 
also allowed them to transcend the Westphalian principle of the reciprocal recognition of 
the legitimacy of all forms of government discussed in Chapter II.  The democracy clause 
provisions in Alfonsín’s foreign policy with Spain and Italy is evidence of this fact.  
However, perceptions of national interests still were not aligned with the United States.  
The perceptions of leaders in the United States were still based on the logic of 
containment and the Kennan Corollary.  In fact, one of the primary reasons the Contadora 
Group failed was because of the United States:  the Contadora accord entailed acceptance 
of the Sandinista regime and it implied a curtailment of U.S. hegemony throughout the 
region.127  However, the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed U.S. perceptions of 
its national interests and eventually aligned them with Latin American perceptions.128  
The end of the Cold War thus finally provided the necessary and sufficient pretext for the 
complete resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the creation of the post-
Cold War inter-American democracy regime. 
 
                                                 
126 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle:  Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 215. 
127 Ibid., pp. 214-215. 
128 It remains to be seen exactly how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will continue to affect 
inter-American relations, particularly from the perspective of the United States.  Although Latin America is 
certainly not the highest priority on the Bush Administration’s foreign policy agenda, there is not yet any 
reason to believe that the United States will completely revert back to a neo-Kennan Corollary regarding 
international terrorism.  In fact, according to Russett and Oneal’s findings, since democracies are more 
likely to cooperate, perpetuating the inter-American community of democracies should still remain high on 
the inter-American agenda.  One real concern, however, is how the politics of September 11 will potentially 
affect the enlargement of NAFTA and the proposed FTAA.    
38 
a. The Transformation of Power 
According to Heraldo Muñoz, the end of the Cold War has inevitably 
improved the prospects for collectively supporting, promoting, and defending democracy 
in the Americas because now “it can be defended without risk of entanglement in the 
East-West confrontation.”129   This is because the absence of both an overriding 
ideological or geostrategic threat in the post-Cold War world has resulted in the 
transformation of the international system from a bipolar world to a multipolar, globally 
interdependent one.  This structural shift in the international system has resulted in the 
conceptual transformation and thus redefinition of power in the post-Cold War world.  In 
short, states must now consider new dimensions of security because “national security 
has become much more complicated as threats have shifted from military ones (that is, 
threats against territorial integrity) to economic and ecological ones.”130  Consequently, 
traditional hard power (military) resources are less applicable to address many of the 
security issues in the post-Cold War world.131  Soft power (ideological and institutional) 
resources are now more often the most applicable to address many of these new post-
Cold War challenges.  Interestingly, Latin American leaders like Alfonsín, Sarney, and 
Arias had the vision to attempt to institutionalize these norms in the Southern Cone and 
Central America well before the end of the Cold War; and well before the leaders of the 
United States aimed to do so too. 
b. The Operating Principles of the Post-Cold War Inter-American 
Democracy Regime 
Genuine convergence on the three principles of the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime has literally taken over two centuries.  Interestingly, this 
regime very much resembles the vision provided by Alfonsín in Argentina well before 
the end of the Cold War:  democracy and interdependence are the primary principles and 
norms of the regime, and international organizations and other forms of multilateralism 
(OAS, Summit of the Americas process, etc.) are constructively used as mechanisms to 
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reinforce these principles and norms.  The principles and norms of this new regime differ 
significantly from the norms and principles of preceding regimes of cooperation.  This 
difference has resulted in changed mutual perceptions of national interests in Latin 
America.  These common interests are identifiable in the formal milestones of the post-
Cold War inter-American democracy regime. 
c. Formal Milestones of the Post-Cold War Inter-American 
Democracy Regime 
In the post-Cold War world, the consensus in the Western Hemisphere 
regarding the virtue of democracy is truly remarkable.  According to Fernando Cardoso, 
the former president of Brazil, “democracy has a worldwide reach that probably has not 
been equaled at any other moment in the history of mankind.  This extraordinary reach 
reflects the universality of the values on which the democratic system is based.”132  
Consequently, a new inter-American democracy regime has emerged in the post-Cold 
War world based on the mutual belief in the collective defense of democracy and human 
rights.  This new democracy regime inherently rejects the Westphalian principle of the 
reciprocal recognition of all forms of government and claims only one acceptable form of 
government in the Western Hemisphere:  democracy.  Instead of simply accepting the 
legitimacy of the existing international system, the Western Hemisphere seeks to 
affirmatively alter the existing order (at least on a regional level).  
The formalization of this third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere 
can be dated to June 1991.133  At this time, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted 
the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American system.  
The General Assembly also adopted Resolution 1080 on representative democracy, 
                                                 
132 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Democracy as a Starting Point,” Journal of Democracy, 12, No. 1 
(January 2001):  p. 8. 
133 It is important to note that this date is admittedly arbitrary.  There are far too many hemispheric 
agreements on democracy that predate the Santiago Commitment to mention all of them in this thesis.  
Consequently, this thesis is primarily concerned with the formal milestones achieved after the Cold War.  
However, one significant protocol that does deserve mention is The Protocol of Cartegena de Indias, 
approved at the 14th Special Session of the OAS on December 2, 1985.  This agreement raised the 
organization’s obligations to advance democracy to an explicit purpose.  This document amended the OAS 
Charter to add a new provision under Article 2 of Chapter 1, “Nature and Purposes.”  The character 
henceforth enshrined the regional obligation to “promote and consolidate representative democracy, with 
due respect for the principle of nonintervention.”  Subsequent OAS declarations and action plans of the 
Summit of the Americas process have reaffirmed and elaborated this duty.  See Andrew F. Cooper and 
Thomas Legler, “The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm:  Questions of Collective and National 
Leadership,” Latin American Politics and Society 43, No. 1 (Spring 2001):  pp. 103-126. 
40 
which set up mechanisms for an automatic response to any illegal interruption of the 
democratic process in any country in the Western Hemisphere.134  More specifically, 
Resolution 1080 stated, “governments shall be held internationally accountable to the 
regional community for the means by which they have taken and secured power.”135  
In December 1992, the Washington Protocol was approved, which allows 
for “the suspension of a member state where a democratically elected government is 
overthrown through the use of force.”136  The Washington Protocol represents the first 
attempt to strengthen the new post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.  In the 
context of regime strengthening, it is important to note that Argentina proposed this 
historic reform.137  This is significant because, once again, it demonstrates the multiple 
and collective contributions to the origins, creation, strengthening, and persistence of this 
third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere.   
Further strengthening of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime has continued within the context of the “modern” Summit of the Americas 
process.  In January 1994, President William J. Clinton proposed to organize a 
Presidential Summit in Miami, Florida to discuss the post-Cold War inter-American 
system agenda.  This proposal was significant because, although it was not the first 
Presidential Summit of the Americas (the first was in July 1956 and the second was in 
April 1967), it was the first Presidential Summit of the Americas in the post-Cold War 
world.  The agenda discussed at the first modern Summit of the Americas meeting in 
1994 included:   
• Democratic principles and values; strengthening of institutions. 
• Common strategies in the consolidation of democracy, expansion of 
commerce, and increased integration. 
• Mechanisms that ensure the benefits of democracy and economic reform. 
• New relationships to overcome obstacles to development. 
• Integration and reinforcement of existing hemispheric institutions. 
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• Counter-narcotics trafficking. 
• Growth and prosperity- growth of trade, mutual benefits, better labor 
conditions, and protection of the environment. 
• Social matters:  poverty, health, education, and the creation of jobs.138 
The 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami was the first Summit in 
which all the leaders were democratically elected, as well as the first one to include 
Canada and the Caribbean island nations.  The Summit produced a “Declaration of 
Principles” and a “Plan of Action” signed by all 34 Heads of State in attendance.  The 
“Declaration of Principles” established a pact for development and prosperity based on 
the preservation and strengthening of the community of democracies in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The “Plan of Action” outlined numerous initiatives for which individual 
countries would be responsible for at future Summits.  One of the most significant 
initiatives that emerged from the Miami Summit was the proposed FTAA by 2005.  
The second modern Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile, was 
collectively organized by the nations of the Western Hemisphere.  It is important to 
emphasize the active participation of sub-regional organizations, as well as that of the 
OAS.  The Santiago Summit produced a “Plan of Action,” and its initiatives were divided 
into the following categories: 
• Education, the principal matter of the second summit. 
• Preserving and Strengthening Democracy, Justice, and Human Rights. 
• Economic integration and free trade. 
• Eradication of poverty and discrimination.139 
The most significant achievement of the Santiago Summit was that it 
institutionalized the Summit of the Americas as a process to address the pressing issues 
of the post-Cold War Inter-American agenda.        
The third modern, and most recent, Summit of the Americas took place in 
April 2001 in Quebec City, Canada.  The Quebec Summit was specifically dedicated to 
the collective vision of a fully democratic Western Hemisphere.  As President George W. 
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Bush told the assembled leaders at the start of the Quebec Summit, “the most important 
aspect of this event is our reaffirmation that this Summit is a gathering of, by, and for 
democracies and democracies only.”140  The Summit concluded with the signing of a 
“democracy clause,” and the collective understanding that membership in the proposed 
FTAA should also require a strong commitment to democracy and human rights.   
In the democracy clause, the leaders of the Western Hemisphere declared, 
“the values and practices of democracy are fundamental to the advancement of all our 
objectives.  The maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for 
the democratic system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment and are an 
essential condition of our presence at this and future Summits.”141  Moreover, similar to 
the spirit of the Santiago Commitment, Resolution 1080, and the Washington Protocol, 
the democracy clause affirms that “any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the 
democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to 
the participation of that state’s government in the Summit of the Americas process.”142  
The Quebec Summit also tasked the OAS to prepare an Inter-American 
Democratic Charter to reinforce OAS instruments for the active defense of representative 
democracy.  This Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted by a special session 
held in Lima, Peru on September 11, 2001.143  The Charter represents the consolidation 
of the new post-Cold War Inter-American democracy regime into a coherent framework 
that aims to positively impact state behavior.  The Charter combines, and more 
importantly expands upon, all the previous agreements facilitated by this democracy 
regime for the collective defense of democracy in the Western Hemisphere.  For 
example, Article 20 states: 
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime 
that seriously impairs the democratic order in any member state, any 
member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate 
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convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake collective assessment 
of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.144 
The principles and norms of “The Western Hemisphere Idea” regarding 
democracy have been completely resurrected in the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime.  The rhetoric of a commitment of democracy has always existed in 
the hemisphere, but the difference in the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime is the institutionalization of democracy as the only acceptable form of 
government.  Perhaps more impressive, however, is the increasing levels of 
interdependence and integration evident in the post-Cold War inter-American system.  
This is significant because economic interdependence and integration has historically 
been the one key issue on which the leaders of the United States and Latin America could 
not converge.  In this context, NAFTA, MERCORSUR, and the proposed FTAA 
represent phenomenal historic advances.  None of these agreements or proposals would 
have been possible without convergence, and linkage, regarding the principles and norms 
of democracy and interdependence:  a successful model of regional interdependence first 
experimented with by Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s.  This model is of 
increasing relevance given the fact that “Latin America has become the fastest growing 
export market for U.S. goods and services, with exports growing twice as fast to Latin 
America as to the rest of the world.”145  Moreover, if projected trends continue, “U.S. 
exports to Latin America will be higher in 2010 than to Japan and the European Union 
together.”146  This fact is significant because, as Larry Diamond notes, “with growing 
trade will come a growing cultural connectedness.”147   
C. ASSESSING REGIME CHANGE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
This chapter has demonstrated that what makes the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime different from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere is 
that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Latin America have finally 
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achieved genuine convergence regarding their perceived national interests and on the 
logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.  Reasons for this 
convergence are primarily two-fold:  (1) the exceptional statesmanship of leaders like 
Alfonsín, Sarney, and Arias, which provided not only a model but an inspiration for 
increased cooperation in the hemisphere and, even more importantly, (2) the end of the 
Cold War itself and the resulting transformation of power. 
The following chapter will critically analyze the strength of the post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime.  In order to do so, the following chapter will employ 
the case study method to test the actual impact of this regime on state behavior in the 
hemisphere.  The cases that will be evaluated to test the logic of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations are two of the highest profile cases of 
democratic crisis in the post-Cold War inter-American system:  Paraguay (1996) and 
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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
REGIME IN ACTION:  ASSESSING REGIME STRENGTH 
Never before have the perceived national interests of the United States and Latin 
America been in such substantial alignment.  Never before have the three principles of 
democracy, interdependence, and international organizations been more ascendant in the 
hemisphere.  The purpose of this chapter is to assess the actual consequences of this 
phenomenon on state behavior in the post-Cold War inter-American system.  More 
specifically, this chapter will critically analyze the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime in action in order to assess the relative strength of this third regime of 
cooperation in the hemisphere.  The methodology employed to test the strength of this 
regime is the case-study method.  The findings of these two case studies will be 
extrapolated in the following chapter in order to assess the potential consequences of the 
post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in the twenty-first century.   
A. THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS 
This chapter will test the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime.  The logic of this regime is based on the empirical research of Russett and Oneal 
regarding the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations on state behavior introduced in Chapter II.  In short, the logic 
of this regime is that these three principles are mutually reinforcing in perpetuating a 
qualitative peace in the post-Cold War inter-American system. 
The specific case studies selected to test Russett and Oneal’s theory regarding the 
logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime are:  Paraguay (1996) and 
Peru (2000).  These two case studies were selected for the following reasons.  First, both 
occurred well after the 1991 Santiago Commitment.  Both cases thus occurred after the 
initial formalization of this new regime, and this fact provides reasonable time for the 
institutionalization of its principles and norms.  For example, at the time of the Paraguay 
crises in 1996, Resolution 1080 had already been invoked on three previous occasions:  
Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993).148  Second, in both cases, democracy 
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was ultimately preserved.  This provides a unique opportunity to assess the actual 
consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in two 
independent cases.  In short, if Russett and Oneal’s theory is valid, the following should 
be observed:  the mutually reinforcing dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations (the independent variable) are primarily responsible for 
preserving democracy (the dependent variable) in both case studies.  If so, these findings 
will represent notable evidence supporting the causal proposition.  However, if the 
correlation between the independent and dependent variable is a spurious one, then at 
least one of the cases should suggest the possibility of an alternative theory (or at least 
potential intervening variables) to help explain why democracy was still preserved.  If so, 
these finding will represent evidence suggesting that the causal proposition is less robust 
than originally posited by Russett and Oneal.  The two case studies will be critically 
analyzed in chronological order.   
B. PARAGUAY (1996) 
Paraguay has had a long, seemingly “pathological,” history of military coups and 
civil conflict.  For example, the twentieth century alone saw 26 governments between 
1904 and 1994.149  In 1993, for the first time ever, the Presidency was garnered by a 
civilian.  President Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected in a free, direct, and competitive 
election that was monitored by the OAS and numerous other international observers.  
However, the consolidation of democracy in a country with enormous economic and 
social problems and virtually no tradition of democratic governance inevitably 
encountered many difficulties.150     
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1. Background of the Case 
President Wasmosy’s most serious challenge to democratic consolidation was the 
continued involvement of the military in domestic politics, most notably the involvement 
of army commander Major General Lino César Oviedo.151  Oviedo demanded that 
Wasmosy appoint not only his preferences for military posts, but also for offices such as 
Supreme Court Justices.  In short, “General Oviedo’s involvement in governmental 
decisions and party politics constituted a direct challenge to the president’s authority and 
a serious threat to Paraguay’s fragile democratic transition.”152  Consequently, Wasmosy 
concluded that his survival as president was contingent upon the removal of Oviedo as 
commander of the army.   
On April 22, 1996, Wasmosy informed Oviedo that he was relieving him of his 
duties.  Oviedo refused to submit his resignation.  In fact, Oviedo, who was a key 
supporter of the military coup in 1989 by General Andrés Rodriguez, informed the 
president and the commanders of the other military services that “if the 1989 coup had 
seen bloodshed, the current confrontation could see rivers of blood.”153  Oviedo’s 
unwillingness to step down as ordered by his commander in chief “touched off a 
constitutional crisis from April 22 to 24, 1996, that raised profound concern throughout 
the country and in the international community.”154  
In response to the developing crisis, the United States embassy in Paraguay issued 
the following communiqué:  “General Oviedo’s refusal to accept the president’s decision 
constitutes a direct challenge to the constitutional order in Paraguay and runs counter to 
the democratic norms accept by the countries of this hemisphere.”  The statement  
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continued, “any course of action other than the resignation of the general is totally 
unacceptable and will be met with the appropriate response by the international 
community.”155  
The response from the rest of the international community, especially from the 
ambassadors of Argentina and Brazil in Paraguay, as well as from members of the 
Permanent Council of the OAS back in Washington, D.C., was equally resolute.  The 
international diplomatic community quickly galvanized support for Wasmosy.  For 
example, he received diplomatic support from international organizations such as the 
European Union (EU), MERCOSUR, and the Rio Group.  Moreover, the Permanent 
Council of the OAS called an emergency meeting to consider whether to convene a 
General Assembly pursuant to Resolution 1080.  This is significant because, technically, 
there had in fact been no interruption of the constitutional order at this point of the crisis.  
President Wasmosy was still the Head of State and no military coup had been attempted, 
nor was there any intelligence to suggest that one was imminent.  As Domingo Laíno, 
Chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) at the time of the OAS 
Democratic Forum in 1997 explains, Oviedo’s strategy was truly unique and 
unprecedented. 
The insurgents did not go for a traditional coup, that is, an undisguised 
overthrow of established authority in defiance of the Constitution.  That 
was the traditional way.  The insurgents in April in Paraguay tried to 
inaugurate a new style, which I call “coup under the table.”  That is to say, 
a show of respect for existing laws and the Constitution while applying 
pressure on threats to remove the constitutional government through 
resignation.  The leader of the insurgency did not aspire to the presidency, 
he only wanted it to go the speaker of the Congress—the third in the 
constitutional order of succession.  Thus, to all appearances, the 
Constitution and the rule of law were respected.  The leader of the 
insurgency may have been seeking in this way to run the government from 
under the table.156 
At the OAS Permanent Council meeting, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott urged fellow members to issue a strong declaration of support for democracy.  
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More specifically, he argued, “we face a situation that calls upon our governments and 
peoples to speak up forthrightly and to take action in support of the proposition that 
democracy is the right of all peoples in the Americas and that the day of the dictator is 
over.”157  It is important to also note that at this point of time in the crisis, the United 
States had already suspended all military aid to Paraguay and was prepared to impose 
economic sanctions if deemed necessary.  In the end, the OAS declared its collective 
support for President Wasmosy and condemned the threat to democracy posed by 
General Oviedo.   
On April 24, 1996, General Oviedo officially resigned as army commander and 
was replaced by General Rodrigo Diaz.  After his resignation, Oviedo faced 
congressional and judicial inquiries into his insubordination.  However, the courts failed 
to convict Oviedo because was still very influential in Paraguay and, technically, he had 
“resigned” from office.  In the following months after his resignation, Oviedo worked 
diligently to obtain the presidential nomination for the Colorado party.  Ironically, 
Oviedo was still quite popular among rural Paraguayans based on his strong leadership 
traits.158  On September 7, 1997, Oviedo won a close election for the presidential 
nomination of the Colorado party.  However, due to fears by the government that Oviedo 
might gain presidential victory, a special military tribunal was convened in March 1998.  
The military tribunal sentenced Oviedo to 10 years in prison for sedition.  The Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction, even though the lower courts had failed to convict Oviedo 
of the very same charge just one year earlier.   
After Oviedo’s conviction, his vice-presidential running mate, Raúl Cubas, 
became the Colorado party’s presidential candidate.  On May 10, 1998, Cubas was 
elected president.  His first official action once he assumed office was to pardon Oviedo.  
On December 2, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that President Cubas had exceeded his 
executive authority in pardoning Oviedo and he promptly announced that he would not 
respect its decision.  Thus, in just two short years after Oviedo was the source of 
Paraguay’s first constitutional crisis after their initial democratic elections, he was also 
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the source of their second constitutional crisis.  Amid rumors that Oviedo ordered the 
assassination of Vice President Argaña Cubas was impeached by the lower chamber.  The 
impeachment process led to widespread street demonstrations and civil unrest.  However, 
as in 1996, the international community provided its unconditional and collective support 
for a peaceful resolution of this process.   
2. The Democracy Regime in Action  
A critical examination of the Paraguay case study suggests that the post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime positively impacted state (and individual) behavior.  
The causal proposition regarding the logic of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations was proven valid because both the Westphalian principle of 
the reciprocal recognition of all forms of government and the Latin American principle of 
non-intervention (Calvo Doctrine) were collectively rejected by the nation-states of the 
inter-American system.  In short, the United States, the MERCOSUR countries, and the 
OAS all worked together to construct a hemispheric network of democratic solidarity in 
this crisis. 
It is important to note, however, that although all three principles of the post-Cold 
War inter-American democracy regime seemingly contributed to the peaceful resolution 
of the Paraguay crisis, the MERCOSUR countries, and the swift action of its presidents, 
foreign ministers, and even some of their military, probably played the key deterrent 
role.159  In short, MEROSUR warned General Oviedo and his supporters that if they were 
to succeed, Paraguay would suffer sanctions that could potentially exclude them from 
MERCOSUR’s basic agreements.  Considering that Paraguay channels a third of its 
foreign trade through MERCOSUR, this warning had a powerful impact on not only the 
actors supporting the coup but on public opinion in the country as well.160  
MERCOSUR’s warning clearly demonstrates the logic of interdependence and its 
individual effect on state behavior.  More importantly, this sequence of events was 
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unprecedented in Latin America history.  First, a regional (South American) economic 
and trade organization violated the seemingly sacrosanct principle of nonintervention by 
“intervening” in the domestic political affairs of one of its member states in order to 
preserve democracy.  Second, “legally, the threat to expel an anti-democratic member of 
MERCOSUR was questionable at that time because the bloc lacked the so called 
‘democracy clause’ at the time the April crisis arose.”161  Consequently, had the United 
States and the rest of the OAS been ambivalent in their support, the expulsion of 
Paraguay by the other members of MERCOSUR would have been legally open to 
challenge.  It was not until two months after the Paraguay crisis that the four presidents of 
the MERCOSUR countries met in San Luis, Argentina to sign a formal democracy 
clause.162  The MERCOSUR “democratic commitment” states, “the full effectiveness of 
democratic institutions of democratic institutions is an essential condition for 
cooperation,” and, “any disturbance of the democratic order constitutes an unacceptable 
obstacle to the continuity of the integration process.”163  This democratic commitment 
represents a further strengthening of MERCOSUR and of the entire post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime based on the lessons learned from the Paraguay crisis.     
The Paraguay case seems to represent a strong case for the actual impact of the 
post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime on state behavior in the region.   
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International organizations clearly supported the principles and norms of democracy and 
interdependence, and these dynamics proved mutually reinforcing in preserving 
democracy in Paraguay.  
A critical analysis of this case does not suggest a viable alternative explanation 
for the outcome.  However, Valenzuela (1999) does offer an interesting intervening 
variable.  According to Valenzuela, “a close examination of the events in Paraguay 
suggests that growing economic ties with other countries and fears of being isolated 
economically played a smaller role than did other factors in averting a coup.”164  The 
“other factors” that Valenzuela offers are the strong support extended by the armed forces 
in backing President Wasmosy, as well as the support extended by large segments of the 
population in Paraguay.  These intervening variables, although interesting, are not 
compelling given Paraguay’s tumultuous history of dictatorial rule, the manipulation of 
the primary process in 1992 that resulted in Wasmosy’s election in 1993, and the 
country’s relatively short experience with democratic institutions.  
In this context, it is important to note that in April, at the critical moment of the 
crisis, the Colorado Party largely remained silent.165  This silence is extraordinary given 
the fact that the Colorado Party was in power at the time of the crisis; the very party of 
President Wasmosy, and yet they literally remained silent while MERCOSUR, the United 
States, and the OAS collectively responded and acted immediately.  Considering 
Paraguay’s lack of experience with democracy, it seems more likely that any strength of 
their democratic institutions and civil society is probably also attributable to the impact of 
the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.  Valenzuela does not adequately 
consider these exogenous sources of Paraguay’s domestic support for democracy.  More 
specifically, the internalization of the norms and principles of democracy and 
interdependence is a fundamental purpose of the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime.  This regime thus inherently aims to not only impact state behavior 
among states, but, just as importantly, individual behavior within states as well.  Actors 
conform to the principles and norms of this regime “in part for ‘rational’ reasons (for 
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instance, because of the costs involved in ‘bucking the system’ and the resources that 
become available through conformity) but also because they become socialized to accept 
these values, rules, and roles.” 166  Actors internalize the roles and rules as scripts to 
which they conform, not always necessarily out of conscious choice, “but because they 
understand these behaviors to be appropriate.”167       
In the final analysis, the manner in which the Paraguay democratic crisis was 
resolved provides notable evidence supporting the causal proposition.  In this specific 
case, the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime positively impacted state 
behavior.  The next section will critically analyze the Peru democratic crisis and assess 
whether the process of its resolution supports or does not support the causal proposition. 
C. PERU (2000) 
After Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe in April 1992, Peru became a textbook case of 
an illiberal democracy:  “a regime that combines free elections for political office with 
systematic disrespect for the political and human rights of its citizens.”168  Although 
Fujimori governed in this manner throughout his entire presidency, he was still very 
popular (at least in the beginning).  According to Yergin and Stanislaw (2002), Fujimori 
was considered the greatest president Peru had ever known because of the way he saved 
his country from economic chaos and a vicious civil war.169  However, as Peru became 
the first South American country of the 1990s to slip back into authoritarianism, the 
reality of Fujimori’s illiberal democracy was never really challenged by any exogenous 
or endogenous forces in the hemisphere; that is, not until after the 2000 election, a 
campaign that culminated in a vote that The Economist called “the dirtiest vote in South 
America for a decade.”170  This section of the thesis will critically analyze the chain of 
events leading up to the fraudulent 2000 election to test the actual impact of the post-
Cold War inter-American democracy regime on state behavior in this specific case.    
                                                 
166 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 29. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 5th ed. (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 214. 
169 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights:  The Battle for the World 
Economy, (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p. 255. 
170 Ibid., p. 254. 
55 
1. Background of the Case 
In order to understand the conditions that resulted in Fujimori’s downfall 
following the fraudulent election of 2000, it is necessary to appreciate the conditions that 
resulted in his initial election to power in 1990.  Thus, the chain of events leading up to 
the 2000 democratic crisis in Peru actually begins a decade earlier. 
Stable governments in Peru, whether democratic or authoritarian, have been 
extremely rare throughout its history.  For example, “since 1919, no Peruvian political 
regime- neither constitutional nor de facto- has endured more than twelve years.”171  This 
political legacy is important in understanding and appreciating the nature of Alberto 
Fujimori’s initial mandate when originally elected president of Peru in 1990.  The 
Peruvian people were desperate for stability, particularly since by the end of the 
preceding administration of Alan García, “real per capita GDP was estimated to be less 
than in 1960, and accumulated inflation over the five years was more than 2 million 
percent.”172  Moreover, at this time, the Shining Path was seemingly on the path to taking 
over the state:  the Shining Path numbered approximately 10,000 combatants, had support 
of roughly 15 percent of Peru’s citizens, and controlled about 28% of the country’s 
municipalities.173  In this atmosphere of despair, Fujimori was able to literally come out 
of nowhere to win the 1990 election.  With no formal party affiliation, Fujimori was able 
to cultivate an image of himself as an outsider.  In short, “he posed as an antipolitician, 
which gave him broad appeal over established parties and figures.”174  His populist 
strategy obviously worked, as Fujimori won a resounding victory in the second-round of 
the 1990 election with 62 percent the vote.175   
Upon assuming office in July 1990, Fujimori declared that the Peruvian state was 
in crisis.  This declaration was elaborated on by his close adviser, Hernando de Soto:  
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“This society is collapsing…There is no respect for the state, the parliament, the laws, the 
judicial system, not even the traffic lights.  Nothing works here.”176  Fujimori exploited 
his 62 percent mandate to confront Peru’s daunting problems and he enjoyed tremendous 
policymaking power.  Immediately after his inauguration, Fujimori implemented his 
“Fujishock” strategy.  This strategy consisted of a draconian orthodox stabilization 
package.  In short, the Fujimori government slashed price subsidies and social spending.  
It raised interest rates and taxes in order to tackle hyperinflation.  Moreover, “in a move 
to restore international financial confidence and the reintegration of Peru into the world 
economy, Fujimori began making regular monthly payments of $60 million to 
international financial institutions on the country’s now $21 billion foreign debt.”177  
Fujimori’s policies were successful in the context of reducing hyperinflation and 
restoring Peru to the good graces of international financial institutions.  Consequently, 
Fujimori’s success in this regard was rewarded with increased popularity in Peru public 
opinion polls.178  However, Fujimori’s reforms were followed by many traumas that 
directly challenged the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. 
On April 5, 1992, Fujimori suspended the 1979 Constitution, arrested several 
opposition leaders, dissolved Congress, and dismantled the judiciary.  However, “while 
the autogolpe was condemned by the vast majority of intellectuals and political leaders, it 
was supported by almost 80 percent of the Peruvian population.”179  In short, from the 
time of the autogolpe in April 1992 and the promulgation of a new Constitution in 
November 1993, it is nearly impossible to classify the Fujimori government as a 
democracy (of any kind).180   
The response of the international community was less than resolute in this case. 
However, it is important to note three very important things in this regard.  First, in 
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retrospect, there was not really much that the international community could have done 
because it was extremely sensitive to the fact that over 80 percent of the Peruvian people 
actually supported the coup.  Second, the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime had just been formalized with the Santiago Commitment (1991).  Consequently, 
there was no compelling precedent upon which to evaluate an appropriate response by the 
international community.  In fact, this 1992 case established such a precedent as Peru  
became the very first country in which Resolution 1080 was invoked.  Third, the 
international community was seemingly “more concerned with the increasing threat of 
the Shining Path, the progress of drug trafficking, and the prospects for economic 
liberalization than over the setback to democracy.”181  Nevertheless, in the end, Fujimori 
was compelled to hold elections for a constituent assembly within five months and hold 
municipal elections with the next year.     
The path toward Fujimori’s consolidation of power under the new constitution 
was smoothed first by triumphs against the Shining Path and then by economic 
recovery.182  For example, Fujimori captured the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael 
Guzmán and subsequently arrested more than 1,000 suspected “Senderistas.”  Moreover, 
Fujimori’s economic plan was successful and foreign direct investment increased 
dramatically.  “Real GDP rose at an average annual rate of 6.4 percent in 1993 and 13.1 
percent in 1994- the highest rate in the region.”183  For the political and economic 
stability that Fujimori provided, the Peruvian people rewarded him with a second term on 
the first ballot with an impressive 64 percent of the vote.     
After the 1995 elections, Fujimori’s popularity began to decline steadily.  
Fujimori fell in the polls from above 50 percent over the period from September 1992 
until October 1996 to around 30 percent through September 1998.184  The reason for 
Fujimori’s decline was political and economic.  In short, his political “means” were no 
longer justified because the economic “ends” were no longer satisfactory.  The economy 
eventually slowed and, absent the results of the early 1990s, Fujimori was now simply 
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perceived as authoritarian; something the Peruvian people were willing to accept while 
the economy was growing, but not any longer.  Moreover, at this time, citizens were 
becoming increasingly concerned with Fujimori’s principal advisor, Vlademiro 
Montesinos.185  For example, “a poll in early 1997 reported the widespread belief among 
Peruvians that it was Montecinos, not Fujimori, who was really holding power.”186 
As the 1990s came to a close, Fujimori decided to run for a third, and highly 
controversial, third presidential term.  Fujimori’s ability to run for a third term was based 
on a 1998 Supreme Court ruling that entitled him to run once again, “since it would be 
his first under the new constitution of 1993.”187  In the disputed first round of the April 
2000 elections, Fujimori won less than 50 percent of the vote, which forced a run-off 
election with the second-place finisher Alexander Toledo (a U.S. educated professor of 
business).  In the May 2000 runoff elections, Toledo unexpectedly withdrew “in protest 
against what he claimed would be electoral fraud.”188  
The OAS subsequently suspended its electoral-observation mission and the 
suspect election inevitably triggered widespread popular protest in Peru and concern 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.189  The OAS mission’s final report concluded that, 
“with respect to international standards, the Peruvian electoral process is far from being 
considered free and fair.”190  This is important to note because “for the first time in the 
history of OAS election observation, a Latin American election had clearly and carefully 
been judged illegitimate.”191  Nevertheless, even though the OAS mission concluded that 
the elections were not free or fair, the OAS General Assembly decided to not question the 
legitimacy of Peru’s 2000 elections.  “The General Assembly resolved instead to send a 
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High-Level mission to Peru, with a mandate not to review the 2000 elections but instead 
to ‘strengthen democracy’ (thereby implying that democracy already existed) and to 
‘explore’ future reforms.”192  Moreover, unlike in the Paraguay case, the United States 
decided to not suspend aid to Peru.  A comment on May 30 by a U.S. State Department 
spokeswoman that the election was “invalid” was withdrawn the next day in favor of a 
statement that the election was merely “flawed.”193  In fact, it was not until the 
September 14 release of a video that showed Montecinos bribing an opposition 
congressman-elect that the international community finally acted to compel Fujimori to 
hold new elections.   
2. The Democracy Regime in Action? 
A critical examination of the Peru case study suggests that the post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime had less impact on state behavior in this case than it 
did in the Paraguay case.  The evidence in this case study is generally less supportive of 
the causal proposition regarding the logic of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations.  However, this case does suggest at least one alternative 
explanation for state behavior.   
In short, the Peru case study highlights one very important obstacle to the 
continued evolution of foreign relations in the inter-American system:  national interests 
defined in terms other than the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations.  The primary U.S. interest in Peru throughout Fujimori’s presidency was 
not democracy; it was the reduction of illicit narcotics production and trafficking.194  For 
example “in May 1991 Fujimori signed a crucial antinarcotics agreement with the United 
States that was much more to the right than Fujimori’s campaign position on the 
issue.”195  The consequence of this cooperation for Peru was very good relations with the 
United States.  Moreover, through 1999, “the ‘international financial community,’ 
including the U.S. Treasury Department and most U.S.-based businessmen, believed that 
Peru needed a ‘strong leader’ and that a third Fujimori term was the best hope for the 
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continuation of Peru’s free-market policies.”196  Although Fujimori’s eligibility for a 
third term seemed intuitively absurd to most experts, it was not questioned by the United 
States or the international financial community.197     
D. ASSESSING REGIME STRENGTH IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
The Paraguay case study seems to demonstrate that the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime is indeed very strong and that it can positively impact state 
behavior. More specifically, the behavior of the United States, MERCOSUR, the OAS, 
and the Paraguayan people in the 1996 democratic crisis indicates that the principles and 
norms of democracy and interdependence have been internalized by the states, 
institutions, and individuals in the hemisphere.  According to Ambassador Antonio 
Mercader of Uruguay, 
The Paraguayan case is one more example of the current status of 
democracy as an uncontested political system and as the cardinal principle 
informing relations between states.  It escapes no one that the traditional 
neutrality of the law of nations with respect to countries’ internal affairs is 
giving way to what might be described as a social contract among states 
for the defense of democracy.198  
However, it is important to note that the Paraguay case is certainly not a perfect 
one.  For example, the fact that the Colorado Party failed to react quickly to the crisis is 
still very troubling.  This fact it not nearly as troubling though as the fact that General 
Oviedo was eventually officially cleared of all charges and was subsequently released 
from prison.  The domestic internalization of these norms in Paraguay is thus not yet 
complete.  Nevertheless, as Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro of Paraguay has noted,  
Although several aspects of our democracy fall short of perfection, we 
take pride in the progress made over this short period of time.  Today we 
can point to a new, redesigned, reliable system for ensuring fair elections; 
a democratically elected congress, total freedom of expression; and a will 
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and a commitment on the part of the national government to press on with 
the strengthening of democracy.199 
The post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime can be characterized as very 
strong indeed because it was largely responsible for the peaceful resolution of the 
Paraguayan crisis of democracy in 1996.  The Paraguayan people, of course, deserve 
much of the credit as well.   
In the Peruvian case, on the other hand, the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime seemingly had less impact on state and individual behavior.  In short, 
the Peru case illustrates many of the challenges discussed in Chapters II and III of this 
thesis, particularly the challenge of perceived national interests in the United States and 
Peru.  Both had similar national interests in this regard, and democracy was not one of 
them.  For example, economic aid to Peru was conditioned not on “democracy,” but on 
political and economic stability by any means necessary.200  The reason for this is 
because, as explained in Chapter III, economic issues have become increasingly 
important in the post-Cold War world.  Consequently, it is important to the United States 
and the international financial community that Peru, and other Latin American countries 
for that matter, “continue to service their debts, to privatize state companies and welcome 
foreign investment, and to maintain stable national currencies.”201  The “drug war” was 
another major U.S. interest in this regard.  Concern with these national interests often 
superseded the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in 
this case.   
Even though the results of the Peru case study do not generally support the causal 
proposition regarding the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime, 
the case is still very enlightening.  Much can be learned by the initial failure of this 
regime to impact state behavior in this case.  In short, the regime failed at least three 
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times in Peru.  First, it failed in the immediate aftermath of the autogolpe in 1992.  
Second, it failed once again when the actors participating in the regime remained quiet 
regarding Fujimori’s decision to run for a third and unprecedented presidential term.  
Finally, it failed yet once again by taking so long to react to the fraudulent election results 
in 2000.  For example, regarding this latest failure, even though Fujimori’s “one-man 
runoff” took place on May 28, 2000, the OAS did not react until late June.  
In response to the democratic crisis in Peru, the OAS finally adopted Resolution 
1753, “which sent a High-Level Mission led by Secretary General César Gaviria and 
Canadien foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy to Peru on June 27-30.”202  This resolution  
provided the pretext for subsequent democratic reforms, an interim transition government 
in November 2000, and a new round of elections in April 2001.  Unlike in the Paraguay 
case, however, there was no threat of economic sanctions.  Moreover, there was no 
interest in invoking Resolution 1080.  Although electoral fraud is admittedly not a clear 
trigger for the invocation of Resolution 1080, neither is insubordination by a general 
officer (as in the Paraguay case).  Nevertheless, “the representatives of Brazil, Mexico, 
and Venezuela argued that Resolution 1080 did not apply to the Peruvian case.”203   
The most important lesson to be learned in the Peru case is the potential 
consequences of not adhering to the logic of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations.  This is an important lesson for nations to learn because, as 
Henry Kissinger has noted, “it is not often that nations learn from the past, even rarer still 
that they draw the correct conclusions from it.”204  In short, Peru and the United States 
have learned their lessons regarding the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime in the following ways.  First, on November 20, 2000, Fujimori 
resigned his presidency via fax from Japan.  However, “Congress rejected his resignation, 
removing him by declaring him ‘morally unfit’ for office.”205  This move makes Fujimori 
ineligible to run for office in Peru again.  Second, in 2001, new elections were held in 
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203 Cynthia McClintock, “The OAS in Peru:  Room for Improvement,” Journal of Democracy, 12, No. 
4, (October 2001):  p. 138. 
204 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored:  Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-
1822, (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 331. 
205 Taft-Morales, p. 4. 
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Peru, and Alejandro Toledo, who withdrew from the runoff election with Fujimori in 
2000 because he believed it to be unfair, won a run-off election with 53 percent of the 
vote.  “The head of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission to Peru said that Peru did an 
‘incredible job’ organizing ‘free and fair’ elections on June 3 that were an example for 
the rest of Latin America.”206  Finally, in the Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill (P.L.106-429, Sec.530), the U.S. Congress directed the  
Secretary of State to report every 90 days to Congress on whether Peru has 
made substantial progress in creating conditions for free and fair elections, 
and in respecting human rights, the rule of law, the independence and 
constitutional role of the judiciary and national congress, and freedom of 
expression and of the independent media.  It prohibits assistance to Peru 
unless it has made substantial progress with respect to those goals.  It also 
earmarks a minimum of $2 million for the work of nongovernmental 
organizations and the OAS in promoting free and fair elections, 
democratic institutions, and human rights in Peru.207  
In the final analysis, the Paraguay case is definitely the stronger case supporting 
the causal proposition.  The Peru case is still very important though because it effectively 
demonstrates the potential challenges to the logic of the inter-American democracy 
regime in the post-Cold War world.  More importantly, the initial failure of the inter-
American democracy regime in Peru has actually resulted in the strengthening of it based 
on very important lessons learned during the 2001 democratic crisis.   
This chapter assessed the actual consequences of the post-Cold War inter-
American democracy regime within the context of the two case studies.  The following 
chapter will address the potential consequences of this regime.  More specifically, 
Chapter V will specifically answer the original research question posed in the 
introduction of this thesis.   
                                                 
206 Ibid., p. 7. 
207 Ibid., p. 9. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the research question:  What are the 
actual and potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-
Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere?  The actual consequences of the post-
Cold War inter-American democracy regime have already been discussed in detail in 
Chapters III and IV.  Consequently, this chapter will briefly summarize those arguments 
and then extrapolate from them in order to assess the potential consequences of this 
regime in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere.  The plausibility of the 
emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of this regime will be 
critically analyzed by considering the challenges most relevant to the inter-American 
system discussed in Chapter II.  Moreover, the general strengths and weaknesses of 
Russett and Oneal’s causal proposition will be critically analyzed and modifications to it 
will be suggested based on the lessons learned from the two case studies in this thesis.  
Finally, this chapter will conclude with some recommendations for future scholarly and 
policy relevant work on this subject.     
A. THE ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTER-AMERCAN 
DEMOCRACY REGIME 
The actual consequence of the inter-American democracy regime is a liberal, 
qualitative peace in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere.  Chapter II 
specifically outlined the logic of this causal proposition.  Chapter III described and 
explained the principles and norms of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime and how it differs from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere.  
Chapter IV employed the case study method in order to examine the strength of this 
regime and thus its actual consequences.  In short, the Paraguay case study illustrates the 
potential effectiveness of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War 
world.  Paraguay continues to practice democracy today, which is a remarkable 
achievement considering its turbulent political history.  The Peru case study is also 
significant because it illustrates some of the enduring challenges to the logic of the inter-
American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world.  In this case, the regime was 
rendered less effective than in the Paraguay case because of the overwhelming domestic 
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support for Fujimori as well as the multiple and conflicted national interests of the United 
States and the international financial community.  However, although the regime proved 
to be relatively weak in Peru in the 1990s, its long-term impact is already evident given 
the free and fair elections that followed the fraudulent elections of 2000. 
Both case studies demonstrate that the post-Cold War inter-American democracy 
regime matters because it can positively impact state behavior.  Consequently, the nations 
of the inter-American system continue to work collectively in order to strengthen this 
regime.  A recent example of this phenomenon was the OAS decision to invoke the Inter-
American Democratic Charter in Venezuela last year.  OAS members acted quickly to 
denounce the coup attempt.  These actions represent significant changes in the dynamics 
of inter-American relations in the post-Cold War world.   
B. THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY REGIME:  FROM A “WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA” 
TO A “WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDENTITY?”     
A potential consequence of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime 
is that the Americas are plausibly on a path to the emergence of a pluralistic security 
community based on the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and 
international organizations.  The development of security communities is an evolutionary, 
path-dependent process.  Since security communities evolve from path-dependent 
processes, their origins and paths will vary considerably.208  As noted in Chapter II, there 
are three tiers around which security communities are analytically organized:  (1) 
precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction 
and coordinate their polices; (2) structural elements of power and ideas, and the process 
elements of transactions, international organizations, and social learning; and (3) the 
reciprocal relationship between these other variables leads to the development of trust 
and collective identity formation. 
In short, as previous chapters of this thesis demonstrate, the first two tiers are 
definitely applicable to the inter-American system.  The end of the Cold War, and the 
resulting structural transformation of power, represents the first tier.  The post-Cold War 
inter-American democracy regime itself represents the second tier.  However, regarding 
                                                 
208 Adler and Barnett, p. 48. 
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the third tier, the “Western Hemisphere Idea” has not yet evolved into a “Western 
Hemisphere Identity.”  Although there exist numerous shared norms and principles in the 
post-Cold War inter-American system, there are still some major obstacles to the 
development of a broad “Western Hemisphere Identity,” and thus to the emergence of a 
pluralistic security community.  This conclusion will specifically identify three of the 
most relevant potential obstacles in this regard.   
The first and most obvious potential obstacle is mutual trust.  Given the historical 
legacy of inter-American relations, a genuine, reciprocal “we-feeling” may never develop 
in the Americas.  However, in this context, the effects of a growing Hispanic population 
in the United States could potentially ameliorate some of this tension.  Inherent to the 
mutual trust argument is the vast disparity in power between the United States and the 
rest of Latin America.  For example, Gonzalez and Haggard (1998), in their analysis of 
the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, argue that no security community can emerge 
between two asymmetrical powers, such as the United States and Mexico, unless it is 
based on structural convergence- the extent to which the weaker party adopts policies that 
are conducive to the stronger party.209  This argument is not convincing though 
considering the fact that every bilateral or multilateral relationship in which the United 
States participates is essentially “asymmetrical.”  
A second potential obstacle is perceived national interests.  This has also been a 
recurring theme in the history of inter-American relations.  It was particularly evident in 
the Peru case study, when the United States was more concerned with the drug war and 
the Shining Path than with Fujimori’s illiberal democracy.  Perhaps the most critical issue 
in this regard is how the global “War on Terrorism” might affect U.S. national interests in 
Latin America in a post-9/11 world.  
The final obstacle that will be discussed is the lack of democratic deepening in 
Latin America.  According to Larry Diamond, the stability of democracy is intimately 
linked to its quality and authenticity; democracy cannot be consolidated in the region 
unless it is deepened and made more genuine for all of its citizens.210  Since one would 
                                                 
209 See Gonzalez and Haggard, pp. 295-326  
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intuitively expect a positive correlation between the quality of a given state’s democracy 
and the individual impact of these particular restraints on state behavior, the lack of 
democratic deepening in many Latin American countries represents a significant obstacle 
to the emergence of a security community in the Americas.  However, a path to a security 
community certainly exists.  Although the Western Hemisphere cannot yet be classified 
as a security community, the quality of peace has certainly evolved because of the 
strengthening of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world.  
Thus, the strengthening of this regime has seemingly improved the prospects for the 
potential emergence of a security community in the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-
first century.211  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to test Russett and Oneal’s causal 
proposition regarding the individual and collective impact of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior.  The Paraguay case 
study represented a very strong test of this proposition.  However, the Peru case study 
suggested additional intervening variables that affected state behavior that Russett and 
Oneal could not adequately describe nor explain.  The limitations of Russett and Oneal’s 
proposition in this context is that their proposition is primarily a systemic one.  In short, 
by focusing only on the three very broad and related variables of democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations, the impact of other, perhaps less 
obvious, variables is potentially missed.   
In the context of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime, there are 
numerous variables that can potentially support or impede the further strengthening of 




                                                 
211 It is important to note that there are smaller security communities that already exist in the 
hemisphere such as U.S.-Canada and Argentina-Brazil-Chile.  Moreover, the U.S.-Canada-Mexico 
relationship seems to be becoming one as well. 
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Table V-I. Variables Supporting/Impeding Inter-American Democracy Regime. 
 
Table V-I obviously does not represent an exhaustive list of all the variables that could be 
relevant in a given case.  The purpose of Table V-I is to illustrate the complexity of 
factors potentially accounting for the dependent variable.212 Democracy, 
interdependence, and international organizations cannot explain everything.  The 
limitations of Russett and Oneal’s proposition is that they fail to adequately consider 
these sub-systemic variables in their analysis.  
1. Scholarly Recommendations 
In addition to incorporating sub-systemic variables in to Russett and Oneal’s 
proposition when relevant, this thesis has one specific scholarly recommendation:  more 
case studies.  Since the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is just over a 
decade old, more case studies are needed in order to accurately assess its significance.  
Case studies that vary across different U.S. presidential administrations would be 
particularly useful.  For example, the case studies critically examined in this thesis both 
occurred during the Clinton Administration.  A detailed analysis of the attempted coup in 
Venezuela last year, which occurred during the George W. Bush Administration, could 
                                                 
212 It is important to note that many of the challenges to Russett and Oneal’s proposition discussed in 
Chapter II are listed in Table V-I as “sub-systemic variables.” 
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be particularly helpful in understanding why the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime had such little impact on U.S. behavior in that specific case.213   
2. Policy Recommendations  
In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that, in the post-Cold War world, the 
Western Hemisphere is evidence of a liberal, qualitative peace.  This peace is contingent 
on the mutually reinforcing dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and international 
organizations.  These three principles constitute the post-Cold War inter-American 
democracy regime, and the further strengthening of this regime has improved the 
prospects for the potential emergence of a pluralistic security community in the Americas 
in the twenty-first century. 
However, the path to a genuine pluralistic security community of democracies is 
mined with many obstacles.  For example, the Peru case study illustrates that electoral 
fraud is a significant threat to democracy in the post-Cold War world.  In fact, 
considering the strong principles and norms that constitute the inter-American democracy 
regime (specifically those outlined in Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter) electoral fraud is probably a more significant threat to democracy 
than a traditional military coup in the post-Cold War inter-American system.  The Peru 
case study illustrates the significance of this threat.  Although democracy is much more 
than just “elections,” elections are fundamental.  Therefore, one specific policy 
recommendation in this regard is the further strengthening of Resolution 1080 to ensure 
legitimate and credible elections in the hemisphere.  More specifically, “Resolution 1080 
should be modified to require OAS action in the case of an election deemed fraudulent by 
an OAS observation mission.”214  Defining democracy is inherently troublesome.  
However, defining what is it not is necessary in order to perpetuate the inter-American 
community of democracies well into the twenty-first century.   
This will all require truly inspired leadership and statesmanship, in both North 
and South America.  The Americas have an historic opportunity to finally bridge the gap 
between the rhetoric of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the reality of it.  Admittedly, 
                                                 
213 The United States did not initially recognize the case as an attempted coup and it was the only 
member of the OAS to take that position. 
214 Cynthia McClintock, “Room for Improvement,” p. 140. 
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the tasks of the post-Cold War inter-American agenda are great; but, as “Americans,” our 
expectations should be even greater.  In short, history will not excuse failure based on the 
magnitude of these tasks.  In the inspiring words of Dr. Henry Kissinger, “for men 
become myths, not by what they know, nor even by what they achieve, but by the tasks 
they set for themselves.”215  The same can be said about nation-states.  History will soon 
reveal the destiny of “the Americas” in this regard.         
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